SS+ChenowethKatz+-+Djibouti+Infrastructure

INFRASTRUCTURE 1AC

Contention 1: The Task Force

The US Task force for the Horn of Africa or HOA, is currently too small to maintain public health infrastructure. This allows instability and terrorist sympathy to spread throughout the region. Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (__Battling Terrorism in the Horn of__ __Africa____,__ Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 21-22 [T Chenoweth]) The countries of the greater Horn of Africa region and Yemen will remain places of intrigue and danger for the foreseeable future. The United States and the European Union will not enjoy the luxury of again neglecting or slighting its peoples and governments. There is too much at stake, no matter what happens in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria. Indeed, even if Osama bin Laden should be captured and the back of mysterious Al Qaeda broken, the short- and medium-term threats against the region will not vanish. Each country is fragile, some with weak governments and economies, some with autocratically strong (and thus potentially implosive) governments and poor or stagnant economic prospects. The greater Horn of Africa region and Yemen is typified by poor governance—the insufficient provision of political goods in terms of quality and quantity. Security is largely problematic, rule of law questionable, and political freedom wanting. There is much to be done. The inhabitants of the region seek lives that are less brutish and more rewarding for themselves and their young people. In the battle to alleviate poverty, provide more education and better health outcomes, and enhance broad political participation, the United States and other donors must redouble their efforts. They can develop imaginative new ways to support and inspire local efforts. They can devise regional as well as country-by-country responses to critical needs. All such endeavors are also a part of the real battle against terrorism. So will be Washington's own battle for attention to this region. Whereas twenty or so years ago this area commanded more official resources and personnel than it now does, today there are few diplomatic or other listening posts, few knowledgeable analysts, few intelligence specialists, and few persons in government possessing critical language skills. The tiny Combined Joint Task Force, the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, naval visits, and other forms of surveillance can only go so far. The United States can and will help the region upgrade its counterterror and security operations, especially at harbors and airports, but its more profound task is to help inoculate the ground against the spread of terrorist sympathizers. That means winning hearts and minds, which—for victory in the ultimate combat against Al Qaeda and terrorism—means helping to strengthen governance and improve the life prospects of all of the inhabitants of this crucial and endangered region.

And, they can’t win a unique disad – the US is increasing efforts now but they only create false commitment. Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth] Even more critical than combating al Qaeda's financial maneuvering is confronting the cause of the organization's regional resurgence: the anarchy and conflict engendered by West and Central Africa's failed and failing states. To date, the United States has offered neither the leadership nor the resources needed to deal with this problem properly. U.S. local diplomatic capacities remain weak, and initiatives are episodic and vulnerable to downward budgetary pressures. Each time the United States appears to offer greater commitment to the region, it pulls back, suggesting that the administration does not see it as a critical part of its global antiterrorist strategy.

INFRASTRUCTURE 1AC – PLAN


 * Plan: The United States federal government should substantially expand the Africa based public health infrastructure programs of the United States Combined Joint Task Force based in Djibouti.**



Contention 2: Movin’ Djibouti

Advantage 1: Public Health

Lack of health infrastructure in Africa prevents diagnostic testing which means drug therapy can’t be monitored, spurring drug resistant strains. Gary Cohen, President of BD Medical, 1-5-07 (http://www.bd.com/press/newsroom/pdfs/3_HC_Infrastructure.pdf [Awh]) A primary thrust of these interventions has been provision of vitally needed pharmaceuticals, such as antiretrovirals for HIV/AIDS, to people who otherwise had no access. This will remain critical, but it is far from sufficient. The lack of health care infrastructure and capacity in sub-Saharan Africa is a more fundamental barrier, one that may soon inhibit the ability to deploy further increases in funding. The series of interventions that occurred over the past six years need to be regarded as a first stage which addressed the symptoms of insufficient health care capacity in Africa. It is now time to begin addressing the causes. One example is laboratory services. The provision of drug therapy in the absence of diagnostic testing -- used as a quality control to know when drugs should be administered and whether they are working -- is a potentially dangerous proposition. Already in sub- Saharan Africa there is widespread drug resistance among TB patients. But today, the methodology utilized most commonly in Africa to diagnose TB is over 120 years old. Resistance is also emerging to first line therapies for HIV/AIDS and Malaria. One can only imagine the consequences of massive drug resistance to these three diseases in Africa. Laboratory capabilities and infrastructure will be essential for preventing this. Among the mechanisms for building vitally needed infrastructure in Africa, public private sector partnerships (PPP’s) can play a critical role. With this in mind, BD (Becton, Dickinson and Company) is responding through cross-sector collaboration in the areas of advocacy, knowledge transfer, training, funding, and volunteerism, and by creating access to vitally needed technology on an affordable and sustainable basis. This White Paper identifies additional opportunities for private sector engagement, and we encourage other companies to take similar measures. The goal of improving the health and well being of the citizens of Africa is achievable. In our view, there is no practical alternative other than to devote all necessary efforts across the public and private sectors toward this goal.



Unchecked drug resistant pathogens cause extinction South China Morning Post quoting Dr. Ben-Abraham, called "one of the 100 greatest minds in history" by Mensa, 1-4-1996 (Avi, “Leading the way to a cure for AIDS,” P. Lexis) Despite the importance of the discovery of the "facilitating" cell, it is not what Dr Ben-Abraham wants to talk about. There is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand - one he believes the world must be alerted to: the possibility of a virus deadlier than HIV. If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it. AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union - they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the "tip of the iceberg". Two decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than HIV. "An airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen."That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film, but Dr Ben -Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it was killed before it had a chance to spread. Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in the next 20 years - theoretically, it could happen tomorrow.The shock of the AIDS epidemic has prompted virus experts to admit "that something new is indeed happening and that the threat of a deadly viral outbreak is imminent", said Joshua Lederberg of the Rockefeller University in New York, at a recent conference. He added that the problem was "very serious and is getting worse". Dr Ben-Abraham said: "Nature isn't benign. The survival of the human species is not a preordained evolutionary programme. Abundant sources of genetic variation exist for viruses to learn how to mutate and evade the immune system." He cites the 1968 Hong Kong flu outbreak as an example of how viruses have outsmarted human intelligence. And as new "mega-cities" are being developed in the Third World and rainforests are destroyed, disease-carrying animals and insects are forced into areas of human habitation. "This raises the very real possibility that lethal, mysterious viruses would, for the first time, infect humanity at a large scale and imperil the survival of the human race," he said.



And, the task force builds up public health infrastructure throughout the region to improve stability. CENTCOM, 12-06 (Fact Sheet, U.S. Central Command: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn Of Africa Mission; http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp# [T Chenoweth]) The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa is a unit of United States Central Command that conducts operations and training to assist host nations to combat terrorism in order to establish a secure environment and enable regional stability. The mission is focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist activity. CJTF-HOA counters the re-emergence of transnational terrorism in the region through civil-military operations and support of non-governmental organization operations, enhancing the long-term stability of the region. CJTF-HOA provides short-term assistance by providing clean water, functional schools, improved roadways and improved medical facilities. Long-term goals include working with host nations to improve national security. Regional stability is built through capacity building operations such as civil affairs and military-to-military training; engineering and humanitarian support; medical, dental and veterinarian civil action programs (MEDCAP, DENCAP, VETCAP); security training for border and coastal areas; and maritime training with host nations. Philosophy. The CJTF-HOA command philosophy is to provide for host nations a stable, secure environment where all people have the freedom of choice—a place where education and prosperity are within each person’s grasp and where terrorists, whose extremist ideology seeks to enslave nations, do not infringe upon the right to self-determination. CJTF-HOA’s focus is regional, and centered on ensuring host nations have the capacity to secure their homeland and can contribute to the Horn of Africa’s future. Background. More than 1,500 people from each branch of the U.S. military, civilian employees, coalition forces and partner nations make up CJTF-HOA. The area of responsibility for CJTF-HOA includes the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. CJTF-HOA was established at Camp Lejeune, N.C., on Oct. 19, 2002. In November 2002, personnel embarked on a 28-day training cruise aboard USS MOUNT WHITNEY, arriving in the Horn of Africa on Dec. 8, 2002. CJTF-HOA operated from the WHITNEY until May 13, 2003, when the mission transitioned ashore to Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. Since then, CJTF-HOA personnel have built numerous schools, clinics and hospitals; conducted dozens of MEDCAPs, DENCAPs and VETCAPs; dug over 20 wells; and trained with most host nation militaries. Additionally, members of the task force have assisted with at least 11 humanitarian assistance missions, including recovery efforts after the collapse of a four-story building in Kenya in 2006 and the capsizing of a passenger ferry in Djibouti in 2006.

And strengthening infrastructure assists public health. Pekka Puska (“WHO Director—General election: public health infrastructures” 10/27/06 Pg. 1401 Vol. 368 No. 9545 ISSN: 0140-6736 p. Lexis) [Gunnarsdottir] Without a concerted effort by WHO and others to strengthen public-health infrastructure, existing public-health programmes will not realise their potential and new ones will not be fully implemented. More urgently, without strong public-health infrastructures, countries will not be able to respond rapidly and in a coordinated manner to threats such as pandemic influenza. A centrally organised national public-health infrastructure is essential to ensuring that essential public-health functions, as defined by the Pan American Health Organization,4 are met. Such an infrastructure-including a coordinated system for outbreak investigation, monitoring, and surveillance, training, health education, research, laboratory services, and other functions-is vital to success, in both chronic and infectious diseases.



And, health assistance creates sustainable African health care capabilities – avoiding dependence. William Fox, Command Surgeon of the Joint Readiness Training Center, 97 (MILITARY MEDICAL OPERATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE DoD "POINT OF THE SPEAR" FOR A NEW CENTURY, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub202.pdf) As a matter of "homeland defense," the United States must increase disease surveillance and research in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. The basic capability currently exists in DoD, though it is extremely limited. An expanded capability must include cooperative efforts with African nations that emphasize outbreak isolation, containment and elimination. This action will directly **assist** African nations in attenuating disease threats, and allow them to build the capabilities to provide their own containment and elimination programs for the future. Research and surveillance clinics, staffed by U. S. and host nation personnel, should be established in each of the four major subregions of the subcontinent (east, west, central and south). It is worth noting that these activities will afford the United States an enhanced capability to deal not only with "acts Page 27 22 of nature," but also with deliberate uses of biological weapons by a future enemy. • Increasing the national disease surveillance efforts should be linked with an increase in exercises of the scope and capability of the 1994/1995 MEDFLAG series. Such exercises should focus on education and training to improve disease prevention, hygiene, public sanitation, disease vector control methods, disaster management and medical expertise for cases of mass refugees. Medical civic action projects must focus on **assisting** the host nation in projecting and stabilizing the **medical infrastructure** and medical care capability within the areas of greatest need. Mass immunization of children, basic dental and medical care, and medical "train the trainer" programs are highly effective. These exercises greatly enhance the skills of personnel and units in combined and joint task force operations. The relatively low threat environment makes it a good training venue. This deliberate planning and execution can better prepare U. S. military units and higher commands for more rapid response requirements such as disaster relief. The additional benefit of having worked with and trained numerous African personnel could facilitate the rapid inclusion of trained African medical care responders in future disaster relief operations in Africa and elsewhere in the world. • As an admittedly more complex and problematic issue, DoD must have a regional or sub-unified command that can provide a full-time focus on Africa. As noted earlier, the African continental land mass falls under the responsibility of two U. S. military commands (the U. S. European Command and the U. S. Central Command) whose primary focus is elsewhere. Islands surrounding the continent fall under the purview of other commands. The U. S. European Command, in times of crisis in Europe, cannot devote the necessary attention to the 40 African countries that are within its area of responsibility. DoD can no longer afford simply to wait and react to the next crisis in Africa. A regional command separate from the U. S. European Command or the U. S. Central Command should be established to evaluate, plan and execute regional military exercises and operations. A more specific regional focus would enhance DoD coordination and cooperation with the country teams, USAID, NGOs, and PVOs, as well as African organizations such as the Organization of African Unity. One result of instituting just these three DoD changes will be a powerful preventive defense program which, if melded with a preventive diplomacy program, could have a significant bearing on African regional stability. A failure to implement these changes will, at a minimum, ensure that larger and less-well-prepared forces must be rapidly deployed into the next African Page 28 23 humanitarian disaster. Instituting these recommendations provides no guarantee that complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa will be avoided; however, it is likely that the frequency, cost and magnitude of the subsequent interventions will be less. Ultimately these actions by DoD would expand African nations' capabilities for assuming greater responsibility in African disasters. The United States stands at the brink of an era in which, with great vision and minimal additional expenditure of resources, it can profoundly affect the well-being of a huge area of the world. It is clearly in the national interest to do so. History is scathingly unkind to those who fail to rise to the challenges of their generation.



Advantage 2: US Leadership

Current military policies focus on heavy handed antiterrorist strategy, creating resentment to inevitable US prescence in the Horn. Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth] In 2002, to combat terrorism in the Horn, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which involves 1,800 U.S. soldiers and is backed by U.S. Central Command. Based in Djibouti, CJTF-HOA's mission is to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats emanating principally from Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen, assisted by a multinational naval interdiction force. In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million package of counterterrorism measures to be spent in the Horn over 15 months. Half of these funds will support coastal and border security programs administered by the U.S. Department of Defense, $10 million will be spent on the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million will support Muslim education. East African governments have been largely receptive to engagement with the United States. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda even identified themselves as U.S. coalition partners during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the battle for public opinion is far from won. The travel alerts for Kenya and Tanzania issued by Washington and London in 2003 are a case in point. The advisories were widely unpopular -- disrupting international air traffic and undermining the recovery of the region's tourist trade -- and have intensified debates in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam over the wisdom of partnering with Washington. Strong U.S. support for antiterrorist measures under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament has also provoked anger, particularly from civil libertarians (still reeling from the repressive rule of Daniel arap Moi) and from Muslim clerics (who claim that the proposed controls are fundamentally anti-Islam). If it is to gain local support in Kenya and elsewhere, the United States must adopt a less heavy-handed approach. To achieve this, Washington needs a stronger diplomatic and intelligence presence on the ground. At present, the United States lacks a diplomatic resident in several key locations, including Mombasa, Hargeysa (in northern Somalia), and Zanzibar, and it has weak links to other Muslim areas in East Africa. For example, Washington has yet to overcome its post-1993 phobia about engagement with Somalia, a country that sustains al Qaeda infrastructure inside Kenya. More broadly, it remains to be seen whether the Bush administration can provide sufficient political and financial leadership to back up its multiple and ambitious operations in the region, given worsening budgetary pressures and competing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And, outreach operations in Djibouti are a unique issue that fosters a positive image of the military. CSM, 6-22-07 (Ginny Hill, “Military focuses on development in Africa: In Djibouti, US forces combat terrorism with civil affairs work. Will this be a model for a future US military command in Africa?” http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0622/p07s02-woaf.html [T Chenoweth]) Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says [that] he believes [that] this far-flung fieldwork provides valuable training opportunities. "They're developing essential deployment skills, such as construction, camp maintenance, and team-building," he says. "And it's an ideal chance to practice community interaction in a semi-hostile environment." Hathaway, whose Djibouti deployment came after five months in Iraq, says [that] a unique aspect of his Hol-Hol mission is exposure to the local population. In Iraq, he survived incoming mortar rounds to build a runway and military housing, but he never left the base. "Here, we see the same people [every day], we're relating one-to-one." In an effort to overcome the language barrier, the Gulfport team defies Djibouti's punishing summer temperatures to play regular soccer matches with the local children. "In the beginning, we were suspicious, but now we've seen that they are good people and they're doing good things for our village," says Abdul-Rahman Bossis, an unemployed Hol-Hol resident. Director of Public Affairs Major David Malakoff says [that] he believes [that] these outreach efforts can foster a positive impression of the American military, but he is honest about the challenge. "How much of a difference are we going to make? That's hard to say. It's not something that we can judge short-term," he says. "Our target group is today's children, so we're not going to know for 10 or 15 years. But we hope that, in the long run, we could be saving lives." Michael O'Hanlon, foreign-policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, thinks that civil-affairs programs "created in partnership with host governments and combined with efforts to foster economic progress can be very useful as part of a broader strategy."



Without a new military focus on assistance asymettrical foes will destroy conventional US leadership – the HOA task force is the template that will spread throughout the military. (HOA = Horn of Africa) Thomas P.M. Barnett, distinguished strategist at the Oak Ridge Center for Advanced Studies, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College, and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions; 6-24-07 (“Africa command: How America organizes to win war and peace,” Knox News, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2007/jun/24/barnett-africa-command-how-america-organizes-win-w/ [T Chenoweth]) For years now, I’ve argued for splitting America’s military into one force that wins conventional wars and another that focuses on crisis response, disaster relief, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, and counter-insurgency operations. That decisive bifurcation of our forces is currently on display in Africa. I dub the war-fighting force the Leviathan, a term borrowed from the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, whose book of the same name described why man’s life was then filled with wars: the lack of an all-powerful entity that enforced global peace. America’s conventional force constitutes just such a capability in today’s world. Numerous academic studies document that we’re currently enduring less conventional warfare per capita than ever before in human history. America’s role as global Leviathan is the necessary but insufficient cause: necessary to rule out great power war but marginal in comparison to globalization lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty in the last quarter-century. Our struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan likewise prove the Leviathan’s limited utility. If everyone is an "asymmetrical foe," then no one will fight your Leviathan. Instead, much like Hezbollah versus Israel last August in Lebanon, your opponent refuses to fight the war and simply waits for the ensuing postwar, where the Leviathan’s otherwise superior capabilities are neutralized by unconventional means. In doing so, these entities force us to field a force more specifically suited to these postwar struggles. That force I’ve called our System Administrator force, or SysAdmin for short. I employ that information-age term because this force is closer in form and function to the police, emergency response and **infrastructure** maintenance elements that manage our increasingly complex world. Extending that capacity to off-grid locations suffering postwar and post-disaster deprivations is particularly difficult because we’ll often face highly inventive opponents hell-bent on exploiting that tumult for political gain. So, yeah, this force must be able to enforce peace, not just keep it. It will require lots of boots on the ground, and to avoid perceptions of American imperialism, those forces must be drawn overwhelmingly from other countries, especially those currently most involved with globalization’s advance — such as China and India. Globalization comes with rules but no ruler, so this SysAdmin force must skew in directions far different from the Leviathan: more civilian than military, more rest-of-the-U.S.-government than just the Defense Department, more international than simply American, and — most importantly — more private sector investment than foreign aid. The SysAdmin force must be all about improving the investment climate, enabling enough security and economic activity to generate the impression of a low-cost country just waiting to be exploited for its cheap wages. Sound crass? Look at this way: Either we leave the country more connected than we found it, meaning more able to access the global economy and be "exploited" by it or we condemn it to further rounds of deprivation, disaster and mass violence — your choice. No country in human history has developed without access to outside capital, so either we connect these disconnected societies or we can simply schedule our Leviathan’s next visit five years hence. In sum, either we plan to win the peace or there’s little sense in winning the war. Right now in East Africa, in the form of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), we see this bifurcation naturally occurring: The task force has no firepower worth mentioning. Its 1,500 troops consist primarily of military trainers, well-diggers, medics and civil affairs specialists. The task force has never fired a round in anger since being set up five years ago. Embedded alongside this task force, however, is Central Command’s special operations forces, the Leviathan that co-exists uneasily with the SysAdmin. That force will occasionally — and with great discretion — swoop into the task force’s multiple "precincts" like a SWAT force, capturing and killing bad guys with impunity. These are the guys who shot up southern Somalia last January, looking for al-Qaida’s foreign fighters. CJTF-HOA will serve as a template for America’s new Africa Command, pioneering — within this SysAdmin form — new levels of interagency and international cooperation. By combining defense, diplomacy and development — the so-called 3-D approach — in a synergistic manner, Africa Command strives to become everything our occupation of Iraq is not. Many observers decry this expansion of U.S. military power. In contrast, I see our military, when left to its own devices in this strategic backwater, forging the obvious solution.



And, success of the task force is key to AFRICOM and continent wide solvency - this prevents future interventions and conflict. Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth]) America is going to have an Africa Command for the same reason people buy real estate -- it's a good investment. Too many large, hostile powers surround Central Asia for the radical jihadists to expand there, but Africa? Africa's the strategic backwater of the world. Nobody cares about Africa except Western celebrities. So as the Middle East middle-ages over the next three decades and Asia's infrastructural build-out is completed, only Africa will remain as a source for both youth-driven revolution and cheap labor and commodities. Toss in global warming and you've got a recipe for the most deprived becoming the most depraved. The U.S., through its invasion and botched occupation of Iraq, has dramatically sped up globalization's frightening reformatting process in the Middle East, and with Africa on deck, the United States military is engaging in a highly strategic flanking maneuver. Africa Command promises to be everything Central Command has failed to become. It will be interagency from the ground up. It will be based on interactions with locals first and leaders second. It will engage in preemptive nation-building instead of preemptive regime change. It will "reduce the future battlespace" that America has neither intention nor desire to own. It'll be Iraq done right. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa here in Djibouti is the clear model for what comes next, according to Rear Admiral Bob Moeller, who heads up the Defense Department's transition team planning Africom's structure. It is the franchise that will be replicated across the entire continent.

And, hegemony will collapse without creating this new security paradigm and changing the perception of the military. New Straits Times, 8-4-01 (R.S. McCoy, “Dangerous and flawed systems,” Saturday forum; Pg. 14, Lexis [T Chenoweth]) In the coming decades of the 21st century, factors most likely to influence the development of conflict are the impact of globalisation on the wealth-poverty divide, environmental constraints on development, climate change, diminishing strategic resources, increasing pressures from mass migration, and the spread of military technologies, not least, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Anti-elite action from within the marginalised majority and politically motivated paramilitary action indicate a serious lack of structure and culture for dialogue, within the context of middle power states unwilling to accept Western hegemony. The Western perception that the status quo can be maintained by military means is an approach that is not only unjust and ethically unacceptable, but is also not even sustainable in military terms, given the vulnerabilities of urban-industrial states to political violence and asymmetric warfare. It follows that it is necessary to develop a new security paradigm, based on policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict, by reversing socio-economic polarisation, enforcing sustainable economic development and environmental protection, controlling weapons and missile proliferation, and reducing militarisation. It is essential to learn from the experience of the Cold War and fashion a new security paradigm from those lessons. The Bush administration is attempting to establish rapport with other governments, but hard line unilateral initiatives and withdrawal from international agreements are not helping. The US has a record of cooperation and progressive leadership in the past that lighted the darkness of international relations and enhanced the quest for peace and justice. It cannot now turn away its face and live in the unreal world of exceptionalism.



Finally, collapse of US hegemony will result in an apolar world that ends in nuclear war. Niall Ferguson, Prof @ NYU, 2004 (“When Empires Wane”, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244) Yet universal claims were an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political fragmentation. And that remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. If free flows of information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations and NGOs (to say nothing of evangelistic cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology has empowered criminal organizations and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Sarajevo. Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's Muslim enclaves grow, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor reversals--its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish for.



Advantage 3: Terrorism

The current focus on hard line counter-terrorism fails – it only drives more recruitment. Josh Meyer, LA Times Staff Writer, 3-18-7 (In Terrorism Fight, Diplomacy Gets Shortchanged, http://www.thepeacealliance.org/content/view/307/1/) President Bush, members of Congress and virtually all counter-terrorism experts have acknowledged that defeating terrorists cannot be accomplished solely by dropping bombs on them. Ultimately, they say, ending terrorism will come only by addressing its underlying causes. "Our long-term strategy to keep the peace is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror by spreading the universal principle of human liberty," Bush said in March 2005. But a close look at the United States' counter-terrorism priorities shows a strategy going in a different direction. In recent years, the Pentagon has received a larger share of the counter-terrorism budget, whereas "indirect action" programs to win the campaign through diplomacy and other nonmilitary means have struggled for funding and attention, according to a review of budget documents and interviews with dozens of current and former U. S. officials. Nonmilitary counter-terrorism programs have budgets that are measured in millions instead of billions, and in many cases are seeing their funding remain flat or drop. Even within the Pentagon, many "soft power" programs, which don't include direct military action, appear to be getting squeezed out as more money goes to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and special forces missions elsewhere. Some top counter-terrorism officials, seeing their noncombat programs languishing, are leaving the government, including a top Pentagon official. Three at the State Department who ran the highly regarded Regional Strategic Initiative are also leaving. And increasingly, even civilian anti-terrorism operations are being run by current or former military members. The shift has troubled many terrorism experts. The U. S. approach to counter-terrorism is that "enemies simply need to be killed or imprisoned so that global terrorism or the Iraqi insurgency will end," Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U. S. Military Academy, told a House Armed Services subcommittee last month. "This is a monumental failing," Hoffman said, "not only because decapitation strategies have rarely worked in countering mass mobilization, terrorist or insurgent campaigns, but also because Al Qaeda's ability to continue this struggle is … predicated on its capacity to attract new recruits" by publicizing U. S. military actions.



And, current military policy makes terrorism inevitable – only revitalizing the task force development aid can solve the global war on terror. Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth]) "We could have solved all of East Africa in less than eight weeks," says the Centcom source, who was involved in the planning. Central Command was extremely wary of being portrayed in the media as Ethiopia's puppet master. In fact, its senior leaders wanted to keep America's participation entirely secret. The goal was for Ethiopia to get all the credit, further bolstering America's controversial but burgeoning military ties with Meles Zenawi's increasingly authoritarian regime. Proud Kenya, still visibly nervous from the 1998 embassy bombing, would have been happy with a very quiet thank-you. It was a good plan. And it was leaked to the press almost as soon as it started. Those involved in the Central Command operation suspected two sources: 1) somebody in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who couldn't wait to trumpet their success to bitter personal rivals in the State Department, or 2) a dime dropper from our embassy in Kenya who simply couldn't stand the notion that the Pentagon had once again suckered State into a secret war. The first New York Times piece in early January broke the story of the initial AC-130 bombardment, incorrectly identifying a U.S. military base in Djibouti as the launching point. That leak just let the cat out of the bag, tipping off the main target, a senior CIC leader named Aden Hashi Ayro, who, according to Centcom intelligence, had been completely fooled up to that point, thinking the Ethiopians had somehow gotten the jump on him. Ayro survived his injuries, and he's now back in action in Mogadishu and, by all accounts, mad as hell at both the Ethiopians and the Americans. Six weeks and a second Times story later, the shit really hit the fan in Addis Ababa. Now the intensely proud Ethiopians, who had done all the heavy lifting in the operation, were being portrayed as bit players in their own war -- simpleton proxies of the fiendishly clever Americans. After angry denials were issued (Meles's spokesman called the story a "fabrication"), the Ethiopians decided that if the Americans were so hot to mastermind another intervention in Somalia, they would just wash their hands of this mess as quickly as possible. The return of the foreign fighters to Mogadishu's nasty mix, along with Ethiopia's fit of pique, quickly sent the situation in Somalia spiraling downward. The transitional Somali government, backed by the United Nations, is faltering, and in scenes reminiscent of America's last misadventures in Mog, both Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers are taking fire from 360 degrees' worth of pissed-off Somali clans determined to -- once again -- drive off the invading infidels. Osama bin Laden himself couldn't have written a better ending. Naturally, it wasn't supposed to happen this way. America's Central Command set up shop in Djibouti in May 2003, moving ashore a Marine-led Joint Task Force that had been established six months earlier aboard the command ship Mount Whitney to capture and kill Al Qaeda fighters fleeing American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The task force did register one immediate big hit in November 2002: A top Al Qaeda leader was taken out in Yemen by a Hellfire air-to-ground missile launched from an unmanned Predator drone in a scene right out of Syriana. But other than that, the great rush of rats fleeing the sinking ship has not yet materialized, and so the Marines took up residence in an old French Foreign Legion base located on Djibouti's rocky shore, just outside the capital. Uncomfortable just sitting around, the Marines quickly refashioned the task force with the blessing of General John Abizaid, then head of Central Command, who envisioned Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as a sort of strategic inoculant. If the Marines weren't going to get to kill anybody, then they'd train the locals to do it instead. But CJTF-HOA, whose area of responsibility stretched from Sudan down to Kenya, soon evolved into something so much more: an experiment in combining defense, diplomacy, and development -- the so-called three-D approach so clearly lacking in America's recent postwar reconstruction efforts elsewhere. Because the task force didn't own the sovereign space it was operating in, as U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq did, the Marines were forced to work under and through the American ambassadors, their State Department country teams, and the attached U.S. Agency for International Development missions. If little of that cooperation was occurring in Kabul and Baghdad, then maybe Africa would be better suited. The Horn of Africa was supposed to be Washington's bureaucratic mea culpa for the Green Zone, a proving ground for the next generation of interagency cooperation that fuels America's eventual victory in what Abizaid once dubbed the "long war" against radical Islam. But as its first great test in Somalia demonstrated, the three D's are still a long way from being synchronized, and as the Pentagon sets up its new Africa Command in the summer of 2008, the time for sloppy off-Broadway tryouts is running out. Eventually, Al Qaeda's penetration of Muslim Africa will happen -- witness the stunning recent appearance of suicide bombers in Casablanca -- and either the three D's will answer this challenge, or this road show will close faster than you can say "Black Hawk down."



And, the US must build up its military aid to Africa to undermine terrorist support globally. Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth] ON AUGUST 7, 1998, two massive bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people -- including 12 Americans -- and injuring 5,000. Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. Four years later, al Qaeda operatives struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa's airport. An alarmed United States responded to these attacks with conviction. In addition to proposing significant increases in development assistance and a major initiative on HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration has designated the greater Horn of Africa a front-line region in its global war against terrorism and has worked to dismantle al Qaeda infrastructure there. At the same time, however, the United States has failed to recognize the existence of other, less visible, terrorist threats elsewhere on the African continent. Countering the rise of grass-roots extremism has been a central part of U.S. strategy in the Middle East, but the same has not generally been true for Africa. In Nigeria, for example, a potent mix of communal tensions, radical Islamism, and anti-Americanism has produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy and threatens to tear the country apart. South Africa has seen the emergence of a violent Islamist group. And in West and Central Africa, criminal networks launder cash from illicit trade in diamonds, joining forces with corrupt local leaders to form lawless bazaars that are increasingly exploited by al Qaeda to shelter its assets. As the war on terrorism intensifies in Kenya and elsewhere, radicals might migrate to more accessible, war-ravaged venues across the continent. The Bush administration must deal with these threats by adopting a more holistic approach to fighting terrorism in Africa. Rather than concentrate solely on shutting down existing al Qaeda cells, it must also deal with the continent's fundamental problems -- economic distress, ethnic and religious fissures, fragile governance, weak democracy, and rampant human rights abuses -- that create an environment in which terrorists thrive. The United States must also eliminate the obstacles to developing a coherent Africa policy that exist in Washington. Counterterrorism programs for the region are consistently underfinanced, responsibilities are divided along archaic bureaucratic lines, there is no U.S. diplomatic presence in several strategic locations, and long-term imperatives are consistently allowed to be eclipsed by short-term humanitarian demands. The war on terrorism might make officials realize what they should have known earlier: that Africa cannot be kept at the back of the queue forever if U.S. security interests are to be advanced.

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And, the plan solves public health infrastructure which spills over to terrorism and good governance. Other measures are impossible unless the military acts first. Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (__Battling Terrorism in the Horn of__ __Africa____,__ Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 6-8 [T Chenoweth]) The eradication both of existing terrorist cells and potential future terrorist threats and combinations cannot be achieved without careful, considered attention to uplifting governance in general throughout the region and boosting particular political goods selectively, country by country. Yet, even if the United States and the European Union (EU) were to expend appropriate sums to assist the governments of the region with improving aspects of governance, not all of these nation-states would embrace or welcome such initiatives. Few are anxious to chance their control or dominance internally. Few are as desirous as they might be, and fewer are able, to deliver political goods of the quality and in the quantities that would significantly help to achieve the aspirations of their peoples. The quality of the rule of law or economic enablement, much less domestic security and political freedom, will not change for the better without newly created partnerships forged for such ends between the United States, the EU, and many if not all of the countries in the greater Horn of Africa region. Hence, because the United States desperately wants to reduce the threat of terrorism, Washington must craft new, broad policy initiatives toward the region as a whole and toward the critical nation-states individually. CJTF-HOA, understaffed as it is, cannot be expected to bear the burden of nation building in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. There are ample opportunities for multinational coordination with regard to improving good governance in the region. France has long had a military and political presence in Djibouti. Italy has an interest, from colonial times, in the region, especially Somalia and Eritrea. Britain has colonial links to Kenya, Somaliland, and the Sudan. Norway played a substantial role in negotiating a peace agreement between the Sudan's North and South. The EU as a whole has a variety of ties to the region and to individual countries. The United States once had an important listening post in Eritrea, enjoys naval rights in Kenya, was alternately allied with Ethiopia and Somalia, and has suffered direct attack in Yemen and Kenya. It also has a military base in Djibouti. Americans and Europeans should cooperate to increase governmental capabilities in the region. Working together, they can build new and maintain existing infrastructures. They can find ways to create jobs in a region typified by high unemployment. Local educational efforts are few, leading to high rates of underemployment among secondary school leavers and others with less training. Europeans and Americans can direct their attention to such critical needs, can upgrade health facilities in the crucial battles against HIV/AIDS (increasingly a menace to Ethiopia and Somalia), tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as against dangerous epizootic diseases like Rift Valley fever and rinderpest. They should support local efforts to embed the rule of law and expand political freedom. Positive activities in each of these arenas will directly and indirectly strengthen security and counterterrorism capabilities. The battle against terrorism is as much, if not more, a battle for improved governance and, as a consequence, for local hearts and minds. Although France, Italy, and Britain have a long-standing expert knowledge of portions of the region and high-level staff fluent in local languages, the United States no longer possesses the regional expertise and capable linguists that it once had in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the several military services. Indeed, the greater Horn of Africa region (Yemen excepted) is in too many respects a terra incognita to Washington. Intelligence personnel responsible for overseeing the region may have no direct acquaintance with it. U.S. embassies and consulates are fewer than they were in the 1980s; budget cuts and personnel retrenchments have left U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military services impoverished in terms of an intimate knowledge of the region and the countries that it comprises. Although Washington helped to ensure the ultimate delivery of the Sudanese peace pact of early 2005, there was still no permanent American ambassador resident in Khartoum (based elsewhere since 1997) and no equivalent presence in Somalia.

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(Rotberg continues without ellipsis) Indeed, Washington lacks any coherent vision for integrating and advancing American diplomatic and security initiatives in the region. The struggle against terrorism requires just such a far-ranging vision, directed and coordinated at the highest levels. The battle against terror in the vulnerable countries along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is best prosecuted from a holistic regional perspective. The threat is transnational and respects no boundaries. In any event, none of international land or sea borders presents an effective barrier to infiltrators. Drugs and arms smugglers and cattle and sheep rustlers can cross almost anywhere at will. A history of interpenetration, long decades of evasion, tribal or warrior dominance of frontier areas remote from national capitals, adherence to customary entrepreneurial obligations, and the absence of robust security contingents beyond major cities make regional measures and cooperation necessary, urgent, and probably insufficient. The regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tries weakly to organize relevant common responses. Bringing Yemen into IGAD would be sensible, and helpful in forging a more vigorous common approach to terror and its eradication. (But Yemen may not wish to be considered "African," and IGAD members might resist the inclusion of a new country.) There is no substitute for greater U.S. involvement in any and all forums for the greater Horn of Africa region and Yemen. As important as a vastly strengthened regional approach will be, Washington also needs a nuanced new policy crafted for and appropriate to the region and each of its countries.



And, empirically, the issue of public health is uniquely important to winning hearts and minds. Raymond A. Zilinskas, directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program and Tamara R. Chapman, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 1-24-7 (Security and Public Health: How and Why do Public Health Emergencies Affect the Security of a Country?, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_84.html [Awh]) In working to create a new framework of government in a region that is recovering from conflict, establishing a dependable public health infrastructure is critical to imparting security, both traditional and nontraditional. In fact, public health events could have either positive or negative effects on national security. In terms of public health emergencies being potentially detrimental to national security, counterinsurgency experts have argued that winning the "hearts and minds" of citizens of an embattled nation is crucial to nation-building, something that would be difficult or impossible to accomplish without those citizens being provided with an adequate level of public health. [25] To this end, some analysts have speculated that interminable substandard health conditions in Iraq are a contributing factor to the Iraqis' unhappiness with the U. S.-backed regime, thus feeding the ongoing and growing insurgency. [26] The converse relationship between security and public health in nation building is illustrated when poor security conditions impede residents' ability to seek medical care, compounded by the failure of health delivery facilities to function properly in insecure areas. [27] Nation-building thus can present a circular challenge; without security, it is difficulty to provide a population with an adequate level of public health, but without adequate public health, achieving sufficient security for nation-building becomes very difficult.



And, African terror networks will acquire nuclear weapons to use on the US. Dempsey – Director of African Studies @ U.S. Army War College – __20__06 (Thomas, Served as a strategic intelligence analyst for Africa at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and as Chief of Africa Branch for the Defense Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions, April, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub649.pdf) The threat that terrorist hubs based in failed states pose to the United States and to its allies escalates dramatically if those hubs can obtain access to nuclear weapons. The risk that such weapons will find their way into terrorist hands is increasing significantly as a result of three interrelated factors. The end of the Cold War has witnessed an alarming erosion of control and security of Russian nuclear technology and weaponry. It has also witnessed increasing nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear states. The circumstances surrounding that proliferation—primarily its clandestine and covert nature—make it far more likely for nuclear weapons to find their way from state proliferators into the hands of terrorist groups. The problematic issue of accounting for and controlling Sovietera nuclear weapons and technology has been explored thoroughly by Jessica Stern in her 1999 study of terrorism and WMD. Stern described a Soviet-era military that was melting down, unpaid, and rife with corruption. Loss of accountability for fissionable materials, poor controls on the technology of nuclear weapons production, and poor supervision of Russia's militarized scientific community characterized the post-Cold War Russian nuclear sector. Lapses may have even included loss of operational nuclear devices.46 More recent reporting on the situation is hardly more encouraging. A survey in 2002 of 602 Russian scientists working in the Russian WMD sector revealed that roughly 20 percent of the Russian scientists interviewed expressed a willingness to work for nations identified as WMD proliferators: Iran, North Korea or Syria.47 Most recently, Busch and Holmes have catalogued the efforts of rogue states and of Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons capability from the inadequately controlled Russian nuclear sector, and have identified the human element of that sector as being especially vulnerable.48 When viewed in combination with the growing influence and reach of Russian organized crime, the lack of security in the Russian weaponized nuclear technology sector represents a significant risk of nuclear capability finding its way into the hands of terrorist hubs. Exacerbating this risk are the efforts of non-nuclear states that are seeking to develop a nuclear strike capability. While North Korea frequently is cited as the best example of this sort of nuclear proliferation, in the context of terrorist access to WMD, Iran may prove to be far more dangerous. The clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program is reportedly well-advanced. A recent study of the Iranian nuclear program published by the U.S. Army War College considers Iranian fielding of operational nuclear weapons to be inevitable and estimates the time frame for such a fielding to be 12 to 48 months.49 Given Iran's well-established relationship with Hezballah in Lebanon and its increasingly problematic, even hostile, relationship with the United States, the Iranian nuclear weapons program would seem to offer a tempting opportunity to Al Qaeda elements seeking clandestine access to nuclear technology. Even if the Iranian leadership does not regard sharing nuclear secrets with terrorist groups as a wise policy, elements within the Iranian government or participants in its nuclear weapons program may be willing to do so for their own reasons. The nature of clandestine nuclear weapons programs makes them especially vulnerable to compromise, as the Pakistani experience has demonstrated. The clandestine nuclear weapons program directed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan on behalf of the Pakistani government exemplifies the risks inherent in such secret undertakings. As the details of Khan's nuclear weapons operation have emerged, it has become increasingly evident that he exercised little control over the elements of his network operating outside of Pakistan. His non-Pakistani partners in acquiring nuclear technology appear to have been motivated almost entirely by money, and Khan himself seems to have operated with minimal oversight from the Pakistani government.50 Under such circumstances, the risk that critical nuclear technology will be diverted to groups like Al Qaeda is particularly high, especially when those groups have access to significant financial resources, and program participants are able to profit from diversion with little chance of detection by either the proliferating state or by opponents of that proliferation. While both hubs and nodes exist in failed state terrorist networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, only the hubs present a threat of genuinely serious proportions to U.S. interests. Escalating nuclear proliferation offers terrorist hubs sheltering in failed states the opportunity to translate funding into weapons access. If those hubs are successful in maintaining even a tenuous connection through their virtual network to terrorist nodes existing within the United States or the territory of its allies, or in other areas of vital U.S. interest, then the risk posed by terrorist groups operating from failed states becomes real and immediate. The recent attacks by terrorist nodes in London, Cairo, and Madrid suggest that such is the case. Developing the nexus between nuclear weapons acquisition, delivery to a local terrorist node, and employment in a terrorist attack probably will require significant resources and considerable time. Evolved terrorist hubs operating in failed states like Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Somalia may have both. Identifying those hubs, locating their members, and entering the failed state in which they are located to apprehend or destroy them will be a complex and difficult task.



Failure to prevent nuclear terrorism risks extinction and world war three. Sid-Ahmed, Political Analyst, 2K4 (Mohamed, “Extinction!” Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, August 26 – September 1, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg /2004/705/op5.htm) We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences. A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.