SS+Djibouti+neg+-+EU+CP

__Counterplan Text:__

The European Union should fully fund and implement all possible initiatives supported by or conducted by the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. The European Union should also set up all necessary parallel programs, provide all necessary infrastructures, acquire all necessary technology, hire all necessary personnel, and provide necessary funding in order to ensure that these parallel programs are identical to those of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. The European Union should facilitate cooperation and information sharing in all possible ways with the United States and any other relevant actors in order to ensure its effectiveness. We'll clarify.

The EU should increase assistance to Africa—the US lacks the expertise and linguistic capabilities—their 1ac evidence concedes __Rotberg__, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 20__05__ (__Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa,__ Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 6-8 [T Chenoweth])

The eradication both of existing terrorist cells and potential future terrorist threats and combinations cannot be achieved without careful, considered attention to uplifting governance in general throughout the region and boosting particular political goods selectively, country by country. Yet, even if the United States and the European Union (EU) were to expend appropriate sums to assist the governments of the region with improving aspects of governance, not all of these nation-states would embrace or welcome such initiatives. Few are anxious to chance their control or dominance internally. Few are as desirous as they might be, and fewer are able, to deliver political goods of the quality and in the quantities that would significantly help to achieve the aspirations of their peoples. The quality of the rule of law or economic enablement, much less domestic security and political freedom, will not change for the better without newly created partnerships __forged for such ends__ between the united states, __the EU,__ and __many if not all of__ the countries in the __greater__ Horn __of Africa region__. Hence, because the United States desperately wants to reduce the threat of terrorism, Washington must craft new, broad policy initiatives toward the region as a whole and toward the critical nation-states individually. CJTF-HOA, understaffed as it is, cannot be expected to bear the burden of nation building in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. There are ample opportunities for multinational coordination with regard to improving good governance in the region. France has long had a military and political presence in Djibouti. Italy has an interest, from colonial times, in the region, especially Somalia and Eritrea. Britain has colonial links to Kenya, Somaliland, and the Sudan. Norway played a substantial role in negotiating a peace agreement between the Sudan's North and South. The EU as a whole has a variety of ties to the region and to individual countries. The United States once had an important listening post in Eritrea, enjoys naval rights in Kenya, was alternately allied with Ethiopia and Somalia, and has suffered direct attack in Yemen and Kenya. It also has a military base in Djibouti. Americans and __Europeans should cooperate to increase governmental capabilities in the region. Working together, they can build new and maintain existing infrastructures__. They can find ways to create jobs in a region typified by high unemployment. Local educational efforts are few, leading to high rates of underemployment among secondary school leavers and others with less training__. Europeans__ and Americans can __direct their attention to such critical needs, can__ upgrade health facilities in the crucial battles against HIV/AIDS __(increasingly a menace to Ethiopia and Somalia),__ tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as against dangerous epizootic diseases __like Rift Valley fever and rinderpest.__ They should support local efforts to embed the rule of law and expand political freedom. Positive activities in each of these arenas will directly and indirectly strengthen security and counterterrorism capabilities. The battle against terrorism is as much, if not more, a battle for improved governance and, as a consequence, for local hearts and minds. Although France, Italy, and Britain have a long-standing expert knowledge of portions of the region and high-level staff fluent in local languages, the U__nited__ S__tates__ no longer possesses the regional expertise and capable linguists __that__ it once had in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the several military services. Indeed, the greater Horn of Africa region (Yemen excepted) is in too many respects a terra incognita to Washington. Intelligence personnel responsible for overseeing the region may have no direct acquaintance with it. U.S. embassies and consulates are fewer than they were in the 1980s; budget cuts and personnel retrenchments have left U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military services impoverished in terms of an intimate knowledge of the region and the countries that it comprises. Although Washington helped to ensure the ultimate delivery of the Sudanese peace pact of early 2005, there was still no permanent American ambassador resident in Khartoum (based elsewhere since 1997) and no equivalent presence in Somalia. Indeed, Washington lacks any coherent vision for integrating and advancing American diplomatic and security initiatives in the region. The struggle against terrorism requires just such a far-ranging vision, directed and coordinated at the highest levels. The battle against terror in the vulnerable countries along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is best prosecuted from a holistic regional perspective. The threat is transnational and respects no boundaries. In any event, none of international land or sea borders presents an effective barrier to infiltrators. Drugs and arms smugglers and cattle and sheep rustlers can cross almost anywhere at will. A history of interpenetration, long decades of evasion, tribal or warrior dominance of frontier areas remote from national capitals, adherence to customary entrepreneurial obligations, and the absence of robust security contingents beyond major cities make regional measures and cooperation necessary, urgent, and probably insufficient. The regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tries weakly to organize relevant common responses. Bringing Yemen into IGAD would be sensible, and helpful in forging a more vigorous common approach to terror and its eradication. (But Yemen may not wish to be considered "African," and IGAD members might resist the inclusion of a new country.) There is no substitute for greater U.S. involvement in any and all forums for the greater Horn of Africa region and Yemen. As important as a vastly strengthened regional approach will be, Washington also needs a nuanced new policy crafted for and appropriate to the region and each of its countries.