SS+Djibouti+neg+-+Leadership+Ans

1. Resentment isn’t unique to the horn—US lacks diplomacy in regions all over Africa—Djibouti doesn’t spillover Princeton N. __Lyman__, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, __and__ J. Stephen __Morrison__, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb __04__ (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]

In 2002, to combat terrorism in the Horn, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which involves 1,800 U.S. soldiers and is backed by U.S. Central Command. Based in Djibouti, CJTF-HOA's mission is to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats emanating principally from Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen, assisted by a multinational naval interdiction force. In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million package of counterterrorism measures to be spent in the Horn over 15 months. Half of these funds will support coastal and border security programs administered by the U.S. Department of Defense, $10 million will be spent on the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million will support Muslim education. East African governments have been largely receptive to engagement with the United States. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda even identified themselves as U.S. coalition partners during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the battle for public opinion is far from won. The travel alerts for Kenya and Tanzania issued by Washington and London in 2003 are a case in point. The advisories were widely unpopular -- disrupting international air traffic and undermining the recovery of the region's tourist trade -- and have intensified debates in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam over the wisdom of partnering with Washington. Strong U.S. support for antiterrorist measures under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament has also provoked anger, particularly from civil libertarians (still reeling from the repressive rule of Daniel arap Moi) and from Muslim clerics (who claim that the proposed controls are fundamentally anti-Islam). If it is to gain local support in Kenya and elsewhere, the United States must adopt a less heavy-handed approach. To achieve this, __Washington needs a stronger diplomatic and intelligence presence on the ground.__ At present, the __United States lacks a diplomatic resident in several key locations, including Mombasa, Hargeysa (in northern Somalia), and Zanzibar, and it has weak links to other Muslim areas in East Africa__. For example, Washington has yet to overcome its post-1993 phobia about engagement with Somalia, a country that sustains al Qaeda infrastructure inside Kenya. More broadly, it remains to be seen whether the Bush administration can provide sufficient political and financial leadership to back up its multiple and ambitious operations in the region, given worsening budgetary pressures and competing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan.


 * 2. The task force success is not key to AFRICOM—Barnett only says that the Task force is a model for what the Defense Department would like AFRICOM to look like—this makes the plan irrelevant AFRICOM is inevitable with or without the plan.**

__America____’s soft power.__ Soft power is the ability to get what one wants by attracting others rather than threatening with sticks or paying them with carrots. When you can attract and co-opt people, you do not have to spend as much on carrots and sticks to get the outcomes you want. Soft power is based on our culture, oupolitical ideals, and our policies. If one thinks of Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms in the 1940s, of Jimmy Carter’s human rights policies in the 1980s, or Ronald Reagan’s appeals for freedom in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, all were investments in American soft power. But George W. __Bush’s rhetoric about bringing democracy to the Middle East has not had__ the sametype of __appeal__, in large part because it looked like a unilateral American imposition. Democratic values can be attractive and thus help to prod r uce soft power, but not when they are imposed at gunpoint. The result is shown by the polls in the region. __Being pro-American has become so politically toxic in the domestic politics of many countries that their leaders have to limit their cooperation with us__. Skeptics about soft power argue that anti-Americanism is inevitable because of our role as the world’s only military superpower. They regard popularity as ephemeral and advise us to simply ignore the polls. We are the world’s leader and should do what we determine to be in our national interest. As the big kid on the block, we are bound to engender envy and resentment as well as admiration. But the ratio of hate to love depends on whether we are seen as a bully or a friend. We were even more preponderant in the 1940s, but the Marshall Plan helped our soft power. Similarly, the United States was the world’s only superpower in the 1990s, but __anti-Americanism never reached the levels that it did__ after the “new unilateralism” __of the second Bush__ __administration__. Of course, even the best advertising cannot sell a poor product. We will need to improve our policy product as well. __Recovery of American soft power will depend on policy changes such as finding a political solution in Iraq,__ investing more heavily in advancing the Middle East peace process, and working more closely to involve allies and international institutions. 4. Plan doesn’t change military image—CSM evidence concedes that it will take at least 15 years effects of the Task Force will be seen __CSM____,__ 6-22**-****__07__** (Ginny Hill, “Military focuses on development in Africa: In Djibouti, US forces combat terrorism with civil affairs work. Will this be a model for a future US military command in Africa?” http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0622/p07s02-woaf.html [T Chenoweth])

Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says [that] he believes [that] this far-flung fieldwork provides valuable training opportunities. "They're developing essential deployment skills, such as construction, camp maintenance, and team-building," he says. "And it's an ideal chance to practice community interaction in a semi-hostile environment." Hathaway, whose Djibouti deployment came after five months in Iraq, says [that] a unique aspect of his Hol-Hol mission is exposure to the local population. In Iraq, he survived incoming mortar rounds to build a runway and military housing, but he never left the base. "Here, we see the same people [every day], we're relating one-to-one." In an effort to overcome the language barrier, the Gulfport team defies Djibouti's punishing summer temperatures to play regular soccer matches with the local children. "In the beginning, we were suspicious, but now we've seen that they are good people and they're doing good things for our village," says Abdul-Rahman Bossis, an unemployed Hol-Hol resident. Director of Public Affairs Major David Malakoff says [that] he believes [that] these outreach efforts can foster a positive impression of the American military, but he is honest about the challenge. "__How much of a difference are we going to make? That's hard to say. It's not something that we can judge short-term," he says. "Our target group is today's children, so we're not going to know for 10 or 15 years.__ But we hope that, in the long run, we could be saving lives." Michael O'Hanlon, foreign-policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, thinks that civil-affairs programs "created in partnership with host governments and combined with efforts to foster economic progress can be very useful as part of a broader strategy."

5. Bifurcation is occurring in the SQ— that’s their Barnett evidence they are in a double bind either A. There is no reason we need to increase assistance to the Task Force means SQ policies solve B. They only increase one half of what Barrnet indicates is necessary. Barnett indicates that CENTCOM is a necessary counterpart to the task force __Barnett__, distinguished strategist at the Oak Ridge Center for Advanced Studies, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College, and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions; 6-24-__07__ (“Africa command: How America organizes to win war and peace,” Knox News, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2007/jun/24/barnett-africa-command-how-america-organizes-win-

employ that information-age term because this force is closer in form and function to the police, emergency response and **infrastructure** maintenance elements that manage our increasingly complex world. Extending that capacity to off-grid locations suffering postwar and post-disaster deprivations is particularly difficult because we’ll often face highly inventive opponents hell-bent on exploiting that tumult for political gain. So, yeah, this force must be able to enforce peace, not just keep it. It will require lots of boots on the ground, and to avoid perceptions of American imperialism, those forces must be drawn overwhelmingly from other countries, especially those currently most involved with globalization’s advance — such as China and India. Globalization comes with rules but no ruler, so this SysAdmin force must skew in directions far different from the Leviathan: more civilian than military, more rest-of-the-U.S.-government than just the Defense Department, more international than simply American, and — most importantly — more private sector investment than foreign aid. The SysAdmin force must be all about improving the investment climate, enabling enough security and economic activity to generate the impression of a low-cost country just waiting to be exploited for its cheap wages. Sound crass? Look at this way: Either we leave the country more connected than we found it, meaning more able to access the global economy and be "exploited" by it or we condemn it to further rounds of deprivation, disaster and mass violence — your choice. No country in human history has developed without access to outside capital, so either we connect these disconnected societies or we can simply schedule our Leviathan’s next visit five years hence. In sum, either we plan to win the peace or there’s little sense in winning the war. Right now in East Africa, in the form of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), we see this bifurcation naturally occurring: The task force has no firepower worth mentioning. Its 1,500 troops consist primarily of military trainers, well-diggers, medics and civil affairs specialists. The task force has never fired a round in anger since being set up five years ago__. Embedded alongside this task force__, however, __is Central Command’s special operations forces__, the Leviathan that co-exists uneasily with the SysAdmin. __That force will__ occasionally — and with great discretion — __swoop into the task force’s multiple "precincts" like a SWAT force, capturing and killing bad guys__ with impunity. __These are the guys__ __who__ shot up southern Somalia last January, __look__ing __for al-Qaida’s__ foreign fighters. CJTF-HOA will serve as a template for America’s new Africa Command, pioneering — within this SysAdmin form — new levels of interagency and international cooperation. By combining defense, diplomacy and development — the so-called 3-D approach — in a synergistic manner, Africa Command strives to become everything our occupation of Iraq is not. Many observers decry this expansion of U.S. military power. In contrast, I see our military, when left to its own devices in this strategic backwater, forging the obvious solution.



7. They cant access the new straight times evidence—they have no internal link that says when we fund infrastructure it changes the perception of the military in the world the plan cant overcome the Alternative causalities to perception outlined in their own evidence __New Straits Times__, 8-4-__01__ (R.S. McCoy, “Dangerous and flawed systems,” Saturday forum; Pg. 14, Lexis [T Chenoweth])

In the coming decades of the 21st century, factors most likely to influence the development of conflict are the impact of globalisation on the wealth-poverty divide, environmental constraints on development, climate change, diminishing strategic resources, increasing pressures from mass migration, and the spread of military technologies, not least, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Anti-elite action from within the marginalised majority and politically motivated paramilitary action indicate a serious lack of structure and culture for dialogue, within the context of middle power states unwilling to accept Western hegemony. The Western perception that the status quo can be maintained by military means is an approach that is not only unjust and ethically unacceptable, but is also not even sustainable in military terms, given the vulnerabilities of urban-industrial states to political violence and asymmetric warfare. It follows __that it is necessary to develop a new security paradigm, based on policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict, by reversing socio-economic polarisation, enforcing sustainable economic development and environmental protection, controlling weapons and missile proliferation, and reducing militarisation.__ It is essential to learn from the experience of the Cold War and fashion a new security paradigm from those lessons. The Bush administration is attempting to establish rapport with other governments, but hard line unilateral initiatives and withdrawal from international agreements are not helping. The US has a record of cooperation and progressive leadership in the past that lighted the darkness of international relations and enhanced the quest for peace and justice. It cannot now turn away its face and live in the unreal world of exceptionalism.



8. They don’t have a unique threshold for their impact—their evidence is from 6 years ago—the war in Iraq proves that we can retain our hegemony despite how our military is viewed.

Michael Mastanduno, (Department of Government, Dartmouth College. “Hegemonicorder, September11, and the consequences of the Bush revolution”nternational Relations of the Asia Pacific Vol. 5 No. 2 //_// Oxford University Press and the Japan Association of International Relations 20**__05__**, http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/5/2/177) [Gunnarsdottir]
 * 9. Even if the US looses hegemony no one will challenge the US—this disproves Furgeson**

The end of the Cold War brought forth a systemic change in world politics, from an international system dominated by two superpowers to a system dominated by one. This systemic shift is profound and implies new patterns of interaction among states. It leads states, particularly major powers, to reconsider and possibly redirect their foreign policies. Systemic change also has consequences for order and stability in key regions of the world. __The defining feature of the new international system is the dominance of the United States__ (Ikenberry, 2002). __The United States faces no challengers or peer competitors__ in the traditional sense of great power politics. __It is dominant militarily and economically__, and its core ideological preferences __are__ International Relations of __shared in many parts of the world__. __No other state can balance the United States and no effective combination of balancers is plausibly on the horizon.__ In this context, a key strategic priority of the United States has been to preserve its preponderant position. The United States has sought since the end of the Cold War to maintain its primacy globally and to shape international order in key regions including Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia (Mastanduno, 2002).

3. Our heavy handed approach in Iraq causes resentment—plan cant overcome Joseph S. **__Nye__****__,__** Jr. served as the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration. He is distinguished service professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and author of "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics." In October 2004 he will publish "The Power Game: A Washington Novel." “Can America regain Its Soft Power After Abu Ghraib?” Yale Global, 6/29/**__04__**, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4302) [Gunnarsdottir]

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS: __The Iraq War has proven extremely costly in terms of America’s reputation around the world____.__ Early images of “liberators” pulling down a statue of the tyrant Saddam Hussein have been replaced with images of American guards abusing prisoners in Saddam’s old prison, Abu Ghraib. Just as the picture of a naked girl fleeing a napalm attack achieved iconic status during the Vietnam War, so the picture of a hooded prisoner standing on a box with wires attached to his limbs has achieved a similar status in the case of the Iraq War. Regardless of whether the behavior of the guards at Abu Ghraib is found to be typical or restricted to an aberrant minority, the image will linger. In part this is because wars of occupation are unpopular in a nationalistic age. But it also reflects the widespread feeling that __the Bush administration was arrogant and unilateral in its approach to foreign policy in general and the Iraq War in particular____.__ Even before the Abu Ghraib photos were published, anti-Americanism had been rising around the world. Polls showed that the United States lost some thirty points of attraction in Europe in 2003, and America’s standing had plummeted in the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia. In 2000, nearly three quarters of Indonesians had a favorable view of the US. By May 2003, that had plummeted to 15 percent. In Jordan and Pakistan, a 2004 poll shows that more people are attracted to Osama bin Laden than to George Bush. Yet both these countries are on the front line of the battle against Al Qaeda. Clearly, __the Bush Administration has squandered__