SS+Infrastructure+Aff



For up-to- date team by team 1acs go here =**Draft as of Sat 7/21**=

Contention 1: The Horn

A fourth critical component of governance is the creation of an enabling environment permissive of and conducive to economic growth and prosperity at both national and personal levels. This political good thus encompasses a prudently run money and banking system, usually guided by a central bank and lubricated by a national currency; a fiscal and institutional context within which citizens may pursue individual entrepreneurial goals and potentially prosper; and a regulatory environment appropriate to the economic aspirations and attributes of the nation-state. Only Kenya, reliant on tourism and agricultural exports, has a fully modern economy. Somalia is the outlier at the other end of the economic continuum, and all of the other nation-states are fragile economically. The Sudan has oil, but little else. (Yemen also has oil, but in diminishing amounts.) Yemen has an excellent port in Aden, Djibouti has a smaller port, and Eritrea has two. Ethiopia has coffee. But __the real economic attainments of the nation-states of the__ greater __Horn of Africa__ and Yemen region __have been limited__, largely __because of scarce natural resources and harsh terrain.__ Moreover, __none of the regimes in the region__, except Kenya and Djibouti, __is even marginally concerned with providing more than the rudiments of this__ good of __economic growth.__ Additionally, __corruption flourishes everywhere__ in the region, __sapping efficiency, limiting foreign direct investment__ (except into the petroleum industry), __and undermining__ other political goods like the rule of __law and security."__1 __Infrastructure__ (the physical arteries of commerce), education, __and medical treatment are__ other __key political goods, nearly always the responsibilities of governments.__ Except for Kenya, __all of the__ other __countries__ and areas __in the__ greater __region are poor, with underdeveloped road__ and rail __systems, creaking__ sea and river ports and __airports,__ poor traditional telephone systems and limited teledensity, and low levels of Internet connectivity. Likewise, again except for Kenya and northern Sudan, __health__ and educational __systems are__ either nearly __nonexistent__ or primitive (even by African standards). In the medical services field, for example, in 2001 there was one physician per 35,000 people in Ethiopia, one per 33,000 people in Eritrea, one per 25,000 people in Somalia, one per 11,000 people in the Sudan, one per 7,500 people in Kenya, one per 7,100 people in Djibouti, and one per 5,000 people in Yemen. In terms of the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, Djibouti had more than two, Kenya and the Sudan more than one, and all the others a few tenths of a bed. Ethiopia had only 0.24 hospital beds per 1,000. Comparing health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, Kenya spent the most (nearly 8 percent), Djibouti and Eritrea followed, and Ethiopia brought up the rear with 1.4 percent.5 __It comes as no surprise, given these startlingly low numbers for the delivery of health services, that__ infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births range from 133 in Somalia and 114 in Ethiopia down to a comparatively welcome figure of fifty-nine in Eritrea. Estimated __life expectancy__ at birth thus __ranges from__ a high of __fifty-one__ years in Eritrea __to__ a low of __forty-two__ in Ethiopia. Only Kenya has a flourishing civil society. In Somalia, __civil society is an oxymoron within warlord-controlled fiefdoms.__ It has been increasingly limited in Eritrea, as the chapter on that country makes evident. In the Sudan, civil society has been repressed in the North by the military rulers who have run the nation-state since 1989; elsewhere civil society is a casualty both of the old North-South war and the new war in Darfur. In Ethiopia, civil society has been slow to develop amid the tight embrace of authoritarianism and because of the restraints of traditional cultures of discourse. In Yemen, formal urban civil society is limited, but there is a long history of discourse and debate within tribal structures.
 * Direct aid will fail now – corruption, lack of resources, and poor infrastructure mean that public health systems are non-existent.**
 * Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (__Battling Terrorism in the Horn of__ __Africa____,__ Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 5-6 [T Chenoweth])**



A primary thrust of these interventions has been provision of vitally needed pharmaceuticals, such as antiretrovirals for HIV/AIDS, to people who otherwise had no access. This will remain critical, but it is far from sufficient. __The lack of health care infrastructure and capacity in sub-Saharan Africa is a more fundamental barrier__, one __that may soon inhibit the ability to deploy further increases in funding.__ The series of interventions that occurred over the past six years need to be regarded as a first stage which addressed the symptoms of insufficient health care capacity in Africa. It is now time to begin addressing the causes. __One example is laboratory services. The provision of drug therapy in the absence of diagnostic testing__ -- used as a quality control to know when drugs should be administered and whether they are working -- __is a__ potentially __dangerous proposition.__ Already in sub- Saharan Africa there is widespread drug resistance among TB patients. But today, the methodology utilized most commonly in Africa to diagnose TB is over 120 years old. __Resistance is__ also __emerging to first line therapies for HIV/AIDS and Malaria__. __One can only imagine the consequences of massive drug resistance__ to these three diseases __in Africa.__ __Laboratory capabilities and infrastructure will be essential for preventing this__. Among the mechanisms for building vitally needed infrastructure in Africa, public private sector partnerships (PPP’s) can play a critical role. With this in mind, BD (Becton, Dickinson and Company) is responding through cross-sector collaboration in the areas of advocacy, knowledge transfer, training, funding, and volunteerism, and __by creating access to vitally needed technology on an affordable and sustainable basis__. This White Paper identifies additional opportunities for private sector engagement, and we encourage other companies to take similar measures. The goal of improving the health and well being of the citizens of Africa is achievable. In our view__, there is no practical alternative other than to devote all necessary efforts__ across the public and private sectors __toward this goal__.
 * And, lack of health infrastructure in Africa is a barrier to the success of any other health aid.**
 * Gary Cohen, President of BD Medical, 1-5-07 ([|http://www.bd.com/press/newsroom/pdfs/3_HC_Infrastructure.pdf)]**




 * Advantage 1: Infrastructure**

Although a majority Somali-populated nation, Djibouti's colonial heritage is French. It never endured the misrule of a despot like Siad Barre, or Mengistu Haile Meriam in Ethiopia. It has been remarkably stable since gaining its independence in 1977; France has always maintained a large military presence outside the city of Djibouti and for many years advised ("controlled") the country's treasury. __Because Djibouti__ is now an American and French garrison town, but more so because this diminutive nation-state __guards the__ southern __entrance to the Red Sea__ across from Yemen, __it plays a key role in contemporary counterterror operations and will influence the manner in which the region and its neighbors respond to__ the challenges and opportunities of __improved governance.__ Moreover, IGAD is based in Djibouti. If Yemen were to become a member or an associate member of IGAD, that organization could help significantly to knit the region together and strengthen its existing bulwarks against the rise and spread of terror. In the battle against terror, the government of Djibouti has been more proactive than others in the region. Despite limited resources, it has removed illegal immigrants for other reasons, shut financial institutions with terrorist links, and cooperated with foreign monitoring and collection operations. Most of all, President Ismail Omar Guelleh has moved determinedly to broker peace in Somalia, especially from 1999 to 2003. He continues to seek to exercise a peacemaking and security-bolstering role among his neighbors and regionally. __Washington may wish to find ways to enhance__ Guelleh's mediation authority for __the good of the peoples of the__ greater __Horn__ of Africa region. __But doing so will__ also __mean assisting Djibouti with improving__ the __living standards__ and economic, political, and social prospects of its own people. __Helping to make Djibouti a developmental showcase would not hurt. The country's greatest need is a reliable source of potable water. Its aquifer is rap-idly being depleted and massive investments in modern desalination technology may be justified. With water, Djibouti could successfully irrigate its__ limited arable __land and__ potentially __grow more of its own food.__But the people of Djibouti also require viable service and industrial employment opportunities. Creating them would help to mobilize jobs. In Djibouti, as in the region, jobs are at a premium. Creating opportunities for gainful employment is one of the more obvious and most likely methods of reducing the attractiveness of Al Qaeda and similar forms of terrorism. __Djibouti could be developed as a regional transportation hub: its__ port and __airport facilities__ (now managed by Dubai) __could be expanded and the__ Addis Ababa __railroad__ could be refurbished and __upgraded.__ Djiboutians also require better educational opportunities in English, as well as in French and Arabic. From Djibouti's vantage point, writes Lange Schermerhorn in chapter 3 in this volume, everything that happens in the countries of the Horn impacts Djibouti, and conversely, __Djibouti's political and economic health and welfare impinges on all of its neighbors. Now, more than ever, Djibouti needs a stable region that is developing__ in ways that will complement its own potential as a regional services hub. Therefore, __policy__ with regard to Djibouti must be formulated knowing that every action in the region stimulates a reaction. Cooperating and collaborating with other donors __to help Djibouti attain its objectives for the delivery of social services__, education, and jobs __should be an important U.S. policy objective in order to maintain the stability of this major__ regional __entry point.__
 * Djiboutian infrastructure is failing – we must act now to ensure success throughout the entire region.**
 * Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (__Battling Terrorism in the Horn of__ __Africa____,__ Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 11-12 [T Chenoweth])**



At least 20 million people in __the drought-plagued Horn of Africa could need__ emergency aid if __action__ is not __taken immediately to combat food insecurity__ in the region, United Nations officials said on 26 June. "__The Horn is hit by__ some of __the world's most severe food crises and they are coming faster and more [furiously] because of climate change__, environmental degradation, political and __armed conflicts and__ a host of __other factors__," Kjell Magne Bondevik, the UN Special Humanitarian Envoy to the Horn of Africa, told a news conference in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. "__We__ all now __need to show the commitment to end this cycle of__ despair and __disaster__, which if not stopped could next see over 20 million people in need of assistance," he said. Bondevik spoke at the end of two days of talks in Nairobi between the six governments of the region - Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda; the UN, donors, research organisations, the private sector and non-governmental organisations. The governments and the UN, he said, had agreed on a road map to combat food insecurity. At least 170 __projects would be scaled up, including__ tree planting, rehabilitating land, __veterinary services__ for drought-stricken pastoralists; agricultural advisory services for farmers; bee-keeping; dairy development; fisheries; micro-enterprises; eco-tourism; __digging wells and irrigation systems__, and establishing vegetable gardens. "Although much has been done in this regard, __we must work harder to improve food security__ in the region; the hard work starts __now__," Bondevik said. "We have identified what works best and where. __The biggest challenge is to scale up successes to extinguish hunger__ in the Horn __rather than just fighting fires each time one breaks out."__ He added: "If we want to change the Horn so it supports people instead of increasingly making them victims, I appeal to you all to back this campaign on behalf of those brave survivors of one of the harshest environments in the world. Otherwise this failure will only haunt us all." According to a joint statement by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), __at least 70 million people__ – 45 percent of the total population – __in the Horn__ live in abject poverty and __face food shortages. Four major droughts hit the region in the past six years.__
 * A. Water –**
 * The Horn is the world’s most severe drought area – more aid is needed now to save 70 million from starvation.**
 * IRIN, 6-26-07 (HORN OF AFRICA: Act now to combat food insecurity - UN officials, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/0fade47a3a4a004d0552236dc4085745.htm [T Chenoweth])**



CAPE TOWN, Nov 9 (Reuters) - __The world's richest states must spearhead efforts to tackle a water and sanitation crisis that is killing and spreading disease among millions and holding back economies,__ especially __in Africa__, a U.N. report said on Thursday. The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 2006 Human Development Report recommended that all governments guarantee every person at least 20 litres of clean water a day and spend at least one percent of GDP on water and sanitation. The report, which is regarded as a snapshot on the world's progress on key development issues, also urged the most industrialised countries to raise international aid to poorer nations by $3.4 billion to $4 billion annually. Without concerted action by the G8, a grouping that includes the United States and Britain, millions in the developing world will continue to be plagued by avoidable poverty, poor health and diminished economic opportunities, the report warned. "National governments need to draw up credible plans and strategies for tackling the crisis in water and sanitation," said Kevin Watkins, lead author of the report, which was released in Cape Town. "But we also need a global action plan -- with active buy-in from the G8 countries -- to focus fragmented international efforts to mobilise resources and galvanise political action by putting water and sanitation front and centre on the development agenda," he said. The call to action came amid worrying signs large tracts of the developing world will not meet eight U.N. Millennium development goals agreed by world leaders -- ranging from reducing extreme poverty to halting the spread of AIDS by 2015. If current trends hold, sub-Saharan Africa would only reach the U.N. Millennium clean water target in 2040. The Arab nations are 27 years off the mark. LIVES OF MILLIONS AT STAKE __At stake are the lives of millions of children as well as the health and economic well-being of more than two billion others living in developing nations, where drinking contaminated water from drains or streams is often the norm. About 1.8 million children around the world die each year from diarrhoea that could be prevented by access to clean water__ or a toilet and almost __half of those in the developing world are sick at any given time due to poor water__ and sanitation. Besides health benefits, supporters __predict a global clean water campaign would spur economic growth in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa,__ which loses five percent of its GDP each year due to poor water and sanitation, according to the report. __Each dollar invested in water and sanitation improvements would return $8 through increased productivity__, reduced healthcare costs and other economic windfalls, especially for the poor who often pay more for clean water, the report stated__. Efforts to better manage water resources could also reduce the likelihood of wars and armed conflicts erupting over ownership and access to a basic necessity that is increasingly viewed by governments as a prized economic asset__.
 * And, the impact is linear – the more assistance the less people die each year. Furthermore, these water shortages will create conflict.**
 * Reuters__.__ 11-9-06. “Rich states must help tackle water crisis – UNDP” http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=L08923976&WTmodLoc=IntNewsHome_C4_Crises-2**



As far back as the 1960s, architects of African integration agreed that __building infrastructure was vital to lubricate the wheels of intra-African trade__ and distribute its benefits regionally. The continent's leaders embarked on ambitious projects such as the trans-African highways -- segments of which would eventually stretch from Cairo to Dakar, Tripoli to Windhoek and Lagos to Mombasa. These would provide access to the sea to 15 landlocked countries and improve regional links. "Unfortunately, like the economic integration process, regional infrastructure cooperation and integration has not been an outstanding success," notes eminent Nigerian scholar and proponent of integration, Prof. Adebayo Adedeji. At the turn of the millennium __a major drawback to trade among African countries remains the dire lack of infrastructure.__ Crowded road in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: __There are too few roads in Africa, and they are deteriorating.__ __Africa lags behind the rest of the world in all aspects of infrastructure__ development -- quantity, quality, cost and access. __In__ 19__97, Africa__ (excluding South Africa) __had 171,000 kilometres of paved roads__ -- __about 18 per cent less than Poland, a country roughly the size of Zimbabwe__. As efforts to complete the trans-African highways continue, the quality of existing roads is deteriorating. In 1992 about 17 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's primary roads were paved, but by 1998 the figure had fallen to 12 per cent, reports the World Bank. Today, more than 80 per cent of unpaved roads are only in fair condition and 85 per cent of rural feeder roads are in poor condition and cannot be used during the wet season. In Ethiopia, 70 per cent of the population has no access to all-weather roads. __In many countries, roads are concentrated in urban areas or around coastal ports -- trade routes established during colonial times for the overseas shipment of commodities.__ Far fewer roads link neighbouring countries in regional networks. __Costly transport woes Poor infrastructure makes the costs of transporting goods in Africa among **the highest in the world**__, notes ECA Executive Secretary K.Y. Amoako. African goods are therefore less competitive with those from other regions. __A poor transport system "acts as a non-tariff trade barrier__," concurs Prof. Kenneth Button, a public policy expert at George Mason University in the US, who has conducted transportation studies for the European Union. World Bank studies show that a 10 per cent drop in transport costs could result in a 25 per cent increase in total African trade. The Bank also concludes that __only__ about __25 per cent of the decline in Africa's share of world exports can be attributed to poor prices__, while __the rest is due to__ non-price factors such as __poor infrastructure__ and information services. __Bad roads__, aged vehicles and lax regulations also __cost lives.__
 * B. Roads –**
 * Road infrastructure is lagging behind the rest of the world in Africa, cutting it off from the international economy and creating poverty.**
 * Gumisai Mutume (Writing for Africa Recovery for a U.N Summit Meeting, “Building an efficient road network: Public-private partnerships hold the key to regional infrastructure”. Vol.16 #2-3. 9/02. Page 23 [|http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no2/162reg4.htm)] [Gunnarsdottir]**


 * **

__The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa__ is a unit of United States Central Command that __conducts operations and training to assist host nations__ to combat terrorism __in__ order to establish a secure environment and enable regional stability. The mission is focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist activity. CJTF-HOA counters the re-emergence of transnational terrorism in the region through civil-military operations and support of non-governmental organization operations, __enhancing the long-term stability of the region.__ CJTF-__HOA provides__ short-term __assistance by providing clean water__, functional schools, __improved roadways and improved medical facilities.__ Long-term goals include working with host nations to improve national security. __Regional stability is built through capacity building operations__ such as civil affairs and military-to-military training; engineering __and__ __humanitarian support__; __medical__, dental and veterinarian __civil action programs__ (MEDCAP, DENCAP, VETCAP); security training for border and coastal areas; and maritime training with host nations.
 * And, the task force creates infrastructure to solve water and transportation issues.**
 * CENTCOM, 12-06 (Fact Sheet, U.S. Central Command: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn Of Africa Mission; http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/facts.asp# [T Chenoweth])**




 * Advantage 2: US Leadership**

In 2002, __to combat terrorism__ in the Horn__, the__ __U__nited __S__tates __created the__ Combined Joint __Task Force-Horn of Africa__ (CJTF-HOA), which involves 1,800 U.S. soldiers and is backed by U.S. Central Command. __Based in Djibouti__, CJTF-HOA's mission is to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats emanating principally from Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen, assisted by a multinational naval interdiction force. In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million package of counterterrorism measures to be spent in the Horn over 15 months. Half of these funds will support coastal and border security programs administered by the U.S. Department of Defense, $10 million will be spent on the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million will support Muslim education. East African governments have been largely receptive to engagement with the United States. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda even identified themselves as U.S. coalition partners during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But __the battle for public opinion is far from won.__ The __travel alerts__ for Kenya and Tanzania issued by Washington and London in 2003 are a case in point. The advisories __were widely unpopular -- disrupting international air traffic and undermining the recovery of the region's tourist trade -- and have intensified debates__ in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam __over the wisdom of partnering with Washington. Strong U.S. support for antiterrorist measures__ under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament __has also provoked anger, particularly from civil libertarians__ (still reeling from the repressive rule of Daniel arap Moi) __and__ from __Muslim clerics__ (who claim that the proposed controls are fundamentally anti-Islam). __If it is to gain local support__ in Kenya and elsewhere, __the__ __U__nited __S__tates __must adopt a less heavy-handed approach.__ To achieve this, __Washington needs a stronger diplomatic and intelligence presence on the ground.__ At present, the United States lacks a diplomatic resident in several key locations, including Mombasa, Hargeysa (in northern Somalia), and Zanzibar, and it has weak links to other Muslim areas in East Africa. For example, Washington has yet to overcome its post-1993 phobia about engagement with Somalia, a country that sustains al Qaeda infrastructure inside Kenya. More broadly__, it remains to be seen whether__ the __Bush__ administration can __provide sufficient political and financial leadership to back up its__ multiple and ambitious __operations__ in the region, given worsening budgetary pressures and competing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 * Current military policies create resentment and opposition to US prescence.**
 * Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]**

Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says [that] he believes [that] __this far-flung fieldwork provides valuable training opportunities__. "__They're developing essential deployment skills, such as construction, camp maintenance, and team-building__," he says. "And __it's an ideal chance to practice community interaction in a semi-hostile environment.__" Hathaway, whose Djibouti deployment came after five months in Iraq, says [that] __a unique aspect__ of his Hol-Hol mission __is exposure to the local population. In Iraq__, he survived incoming mortar rounds to build a runway and military housing, but __he never left the base. "Here,__ we see the same people [every day], __we're relating one-to-one."__ In an effort to overcome the language barrier, the Gulfport team defies Djibouti's punishing summer temperatures to play regular soccer matches with the local children. "In the beginning, __we were suspicious, but now we've seen that they are good people and they're doing good things for our village," says__ Abdul-Rahman Bossis, __an__ unemployed Hol-Hol __resident.__ Director of Public Affairs Major David Malakoff says [that] he believes [that] __these outreach efforts can foster a positive impression of the American military,__ but he is honest about the challenge. "How much of a difference are we going to make? That's hard to say. It's not something that we can judge short-term," he says. "Our target group is today's children, so we're not going to know for 10 or 15 years. But we hope that, __in the long run, we could be saving lives."__ Michael O'Hanlon, foreign-policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, thinks that __civil-affairs programs "created in partnership with host governments and combined with efforts to foster economic progress can be very useful as part of a broader strategy."__
 * And, Military outreach operations are a unique issue that develops soft power and trains troops for state building.**
 * CSM, 6-22-07 (Ginny Hill, “Military focuses on development in Africa: In Djibouti, US forces combat terrorism with civil affairs work. Will this be a model for a future US military command in Africa?” http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0622/p07s02-woaf.html [T Chenoweth])**



__In the coming decades__ of the 21st century, __factors most likely to influence__ the __development of conflict are the impact of globalisation on the wealth-poverty divide__, environmental constraints on development, climate change, __diminishing strategic resources__, increasing pressures from mass migration, and the spread of military technologies, not least, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. __Anti-elite action from within the marginalised majority and politically motivated paramilitary action indicate a serious lack of structure and culture for dialogue, within the context of middle power states unwilling to accept Western hegemony. The Western perception that the status quo can be maintained by military means is an approach that is not only unjust and ethically unacceptable, but__ is also __not even sustainable in military terms,__ given the vulnerabilities of urban-industrial states to political violence and asymmetric warfare. It follows that __it is necessary to develop a new security paradigm, based on policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict, by reversing socio-economic polarisation__, enforcing sustainable economic development and environmental protection, controlling weapons and missile proliferation, and reducing militarisation. __It is essential to__ learn from the experience of the Cold War and __fashion a new security paradigm__ from those lessons. The Bush administration is attempting to establish rapport with other governments, but __hard line unilateral initiatives__ and withdrawal from international agreements __are not helping. The US has a record of__ cooperation and __progressive leadership in the past that lighted the darkness of international relations and enhanced the quest for peace and justice. It cannot now turn away its face__ and live in the unreal world of exceptionalism__.__
 * And, hegemony will collapse without progressively changing perceptions toward the military.**
 * New Straits Times, 8-4-01 (R.S. McCoy, “Dangerous and flawed systems,” Saturday forum; Pg. 14, Lexis [T Chenoweth])**

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain __global leadership__ and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this __is the best__ long-term guiding __principle__ and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the __U__nited __S__tates exercises __leadership would have tremendous advantages__. First, __the global environment would be__ more __open__ and more receptive __to__ American values -- __democracy__, free markets, and the rule of law. __Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing__ cooperatively __with__ the world's major problems, such as nuclear __proliferation__, threats of __regional hegemony__ by renegade states, __and low-level conflicts. Finally,__ __U.S.__ __leadership would help__ preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling __the__ United States and the __world__ to __avoid another global__ cold or hot __war__ and all the attendant dangers, __including__ a __global nuclear exchange__. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
 * And, US hegemony is critical to deter a global nuclear war.**
 * Khalilzad, Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation, 95 (Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?: The United States and the World after the Cold War,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring)**


 * **


 * **




 * Advantage 3: Terrorism**

President Bush, members of Congress and __virtually all counter-terrorism experts have acknowledged that defeating terrorists cannot be accomplished solely by dropping bombs on them.__ Ultimately, they say, __ending terrorism will come only by addressing its underlying causes.__ "Our long-term strategy to keep the peace is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror by spreading the universal principle of human liberty," Bush said in March 2005. __But a__ close __look at the__ __U__nited __S__tates' __counter-terrorism priorities shows a strategy__ going __in a different direction__. In recent years__, the Pentagon has received a larger share of the counter-terrorism budget, whereas "indirect action" programs to win the campaign through diplomacy and other nonmilitary means have struggled for funding and attention__, according to a review of budget documents and interviews with dozens of current and former U. S. officials. __Nonmilitary counter-terrorism programs__ have budgets that are measured in millions instead of billions, and in many cases __are seeing their funding remain flat or drop. Even within the Pentagon, many "soft power" programs, which don't include direct military action, appear to be getting squeezed out as more money goes to support combat operations__ in Iraq and Afghanistan and special forces missions elsewhere. Some top __counter-terrorism officials, seeing their noncombat programs languishing, are leaving the government,__ including a top Pentagon official. Three at the State Department who ran the highly regarded Regional Strategic Initiative are also leaving. And increasingly, even civilian anti-terrorism operations are being run by current or former military members. The shift has troubled many terrorism experts. __The U. S. approach to counter-terrorism is that "enemies simply need to be killed or imprisoned__ so that global terrorism or the Iraqi insurgency will end," Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U. S. Military Academy, told a House Armed Services subcommittee last month. "__This is a monumental failing__," Hoffman said, "__not only because decapitation strategies have rarely worked in countering__ mass mobilization, __terrorist__ or insurgent __campaigns, but also because Al Qaeda's ability to continue this struggle is … predicated on its capacity to attract new recruits" by publicizing U. S. military actions.__
 * Current focus on hard line counter-terrorism fails. More resources are needed to address the root causes of terrorism.**
 * Josh Meyer, LA Times Staff Writer, 3-18-7 (In Terrorism Fight, Diplomacy Gets Shortchanged, [|http://www.thepeacealliance.org/content/view/307/1/)]**



"__We could have solved all of East Africa in less than eight weeks__," says the Centcom source, who was involved in the planning. Central Command was extremely wary of being portrayed in the media as Ethiopia's puppet master. In fact, its __senior leaders wanted to keep America's participation entirely secret.__ The goal was for Ethiopia to get all the credit, further bolstering America's controversial but burgeoning military ties with Meles Zenawi's increasingly authoritarian regime. Proud Kenya, still visibly nervous from the 1998 embassy bombing, would have been happy with a very quiet thank-you. __It was a good plan. And it was leaked to the press almost as soon as it started.__ Those involved in the Central Command operation suspected two sources: 1) somebody in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who couldn't wait to trumpet their success to bitter personal rivals in the State Department, or 2) a dime dropper from our embassy in Kenya who simply couldn't stand the notion that the Pentagon had once again suckered State into a secret war. The first New York Times piece in early January broke the story of the initial AC-130 bombardment, incorrectly identifying a U.S. military base in Djibouti as the launching point. __That leak__ just __let the cat out of the bag, tipping off the main target__, a senior CIC leader named Aden Hashi Ayro, who, according to Centcom intelligence, had been completely fooled up to that point, thinking the Ethiopians had somehow gotten the jump on him. Ayro survived his injuries, and he's now back in action in Mogadishu and, by all accounts, mad as hell at both the Ethiopians and the Americans. Six weeks and a second Times story later, __the shit really hit the fan in Addis Ababa__. Now __the__ intensely proud __Ethiopians__, who had done all the heavy lifting in the operation, __were being portrayed as bit players in their own war__ -- simpleton proxies of the fiendishly clever Americans. After angry denials were issued (Meles's spokesman called the story a "fabrication"), the Ethiopians decided that if the Americans were so hot to mastermind another intervention in Somalia, they would just wash their hands of this mess as quickly as possible. __The return of the foreign fighters to Mogadishu's nasty mix, along with Ethiopia's fit of pique, quickly sent the situation in Somalia spiraling downward. The__ transitional Somali __government__, backed by the United Nations__, is faltering, and__ in scenes reminiscent of America's last misadventures in Mog, both __Ethiopian troops and A__frican __U__nion __peacekeepers are taking fire from__ 360 degrees' worth of __pissed-off Somali clans__ determined to -- once again -- drive off the invading infidels. __Osama bin Laden__ himself __couldn't have written a better ending.__ Naturally, it wasn't supposed to happen this way. America's Central Command set up shop in Djibouti in May 2003, moving ashore a Marine-led Joint Task Force that had been established six months earlier aboard the command ship Mount Whitney to capture and kill Al Qaeda fighters fleeing American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The task force did register one immediate big hit in November 2002: A top Al Qaeda leader was taken out in Yemen by a Hellfire air-to-ground missile launched from an unmanned Predator drone in a scene right out of Syriana. But other than that, the great rush of rats fleeing the sinking ship has not yet materialized, and so the Marines took up residence in an old French Foreign Legion base located on Djibouti's rocky shore, just outside the capital. Uncomfortable just sitting around, the Marines quickly refashioned the task force with the blessing of General John Abizaid, then head of Central Command, who envisioned Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as a sort of strategic inoculant. If the Marines weren't going to get to kill anybody, then they'd train the locals to do it instead. But __CJTF-HOA__, whose area of responsibility stretched from Sudan down to Kenya, __soon evolved into something so much more: an experiment in combining defense, diplomacy, and development__ -- __the__ so-called __three-D approach so clearly lacking in America's recent postwar reconstruction efforts__ elsewhere. __Because the task force didn't own the sovereign space it was operating in__, as U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq did, __the Marines were forced to work__ under and __through__ the __American ambassadors__, their State Department country teams, __and the__ attached __U.S. A__gency for __I__nternational __D__evelopment __missions. If little of that cooperation was occurring in__ Kabul and __Baghdad__, then __maybe Africa would be better suited.__ __The Horn of Africa was supposed to be Washington's bureaucratic mea culpa for the Green Zone, a proving ground for the next generation of interagency cooperation that fuels America's eventual victory in__ what Abizaid once dubbed __the "long war" against radical Islam. But as its first great test__ in Somalia demonstrated, __the three D's are still a long way from being synchronized, and as the Pentagon sets up its new Africa Command__ in the summer of 2008, __the time for sloppy off-Broadway tryouts is running out.__ Eventually, __Al Qaeda's penetration of Muslim Africa will happen__ -- __witness the stunning recent appearance of suicide bombers in Casablanca__ -- __and either the three D's will answer this challenge, or this road show will close faster than you can say "Black Hawk down."__
 * Current military policy makes terrorism inevitable – only revitalizing military aid can solve the global war on terror.**
 * Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth])**



ON AUGUST 7, 1998, two massive bombs exploded outside of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people -- including 12 Americans -- and injuring 5,000. Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. Four years later, al Qaeda operatives struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa's airport. An alarmed United States responded to these attacks with conviction. In __addition to proposing significant increases in development assistance and a major initiative on HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration has designated the greater Horn of Africa a front-line region in its global war against terrorism__ and has worked to dismantle al Qaeda infrastructure there. At the same time, __however, the__ __U__nited __S__tates __has failed to recognize the existence of__ other, __less visible, terrorist threats elsewhere on the African continent. Countering the rise of grass-roots extremism has been a central part of U.S. strategy__ in the Middle East, __but the same has not generally been true for Africa. In Nigeria__, for example, __a potent mix of__ communal __tensions, radical Islamism, and anti-Americanism has produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy and threatens to tear the country apart. South Africa has seen the emergence of a violent Islamist group.__ And in West and Central Africa, __criminal networks launder cash from illicit trade__ in diamonds, __joining forces with corrupt__ local __leaders__ to form lawless bazaars that are __increasingly exploited by al Qaeda to shelter its assets.__ As the war on terrorism intensifies in Kenya and elsewhere, __radicals might migrate to more accessible, war-ravaged venues across the continent.__ The __Bush__ administration __must deal with these threats by adopting a more holistic approach to fighting terrorism in Africa.__ Rather than concentrate solely on shutting down existing al Qaeda cells__, it must__ also __deal with the continent's fundamental problems__ -- __economic distress__, ethnic and religious fissures, __fragile governance__, weak democracy, and rampant human rights abuses -- __that create an environment in which terrorists thrive.__ The United States must also eliminate the obstacles to developing a coherent Africa policy that exist in Washington. __Counterterrorism programs for the region are consistently underfinanced, responsibilities are divided along archaic bureaucratic lines, there is no U.S. diplomatic presence__ in several strategic locations, and long-term imperatives are consistently allowed to be eclipsed by short-term humanitarian demands. The war on terrorism might make officials realize what they should have known earlier: that __Africa cannot be kept at the back of the queue forever if U.S. security interests are to be advanced.__
 * And, the US must build up its military aid to Africa to destroy terrorist shelters and funding mechanisms globally.**
 * Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]**



Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that __the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself__. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. __Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of__ current and future __terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism__ (e.g. __biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber__) __with__ its __serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.__
 * And, terrorism threatens the survival of civilization**
 * Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States. “Terrorism Myths and Realities,” Washington Times. August 27, 2003.**
 * http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20030827-084256-8999r.htm**




 * Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its public health assistance to sub-Saharan Africa by expanding the public health infrastructure programs of the United States Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa.**


 * Contention 2: We’re Topical –**

__Without a__ concerted __effort__ by WHO and others __to strengthen public-health infrastructure__, existing __public-health__ programmes __will not realise their potential__ and new ones will not be fully implemented. More urgently, without strong public-health infrastructures, countries will not be able to respond rapidly and in a coordinated manner to threats such as pandemic influenza. A centrally organised national __public-health infrastructure is essential to__ ensuring that essential __public-health__ functions, as defined by the Pan American Health Organization,4 are met. Such an infrastructure-including a coordinated system for outbreak investigation, monitoring, and surveillance, training, health education, research, laboratory services, and other functions-is vital to success, in both chronic and infectious diseases.
 * Health infrastructure is key to public health**
 * Pekka Puska (“WHO Director—General election: public health infrastructures” 10/27/06 Pg. 1401 Vol. 368 No. 9545 ISSN: 0140-6736 p. Lexis) [Gunnarsdottir]**




 * Contention 3: Solvency**

Even __more critical than combating al Qaeda's financial maneuvering is confronting the cause of the__ organization's __regional resurgence: the anarchy and conflict engendered by__ West and Central Africa's failed and __failing states.__ To date, __the__ __U__nited __S__tates __has offered neither the leadership nor the resources needed to deal with this problem properly.__ U.S. local diplomatic __capacities remain weak__, and __initiatives are episodic and vulnerable to downward budgetary pressures. Each time the__ __U__nited __S__tates __appears to offer greater commitment to the region, it pulls back, suggesting that the administration does not see it as a critical part of its global antiterrorist strategy.__
 * They can’t win a unique disad – the US is increasing efforts now but they only create false commitment.**
 * Princeton N. Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at CFR, and J. Stephen Morrison, Director of CSIS Africa Program; Jan/Feb 04 (The Terrorist Threat in Africa., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Vol. 83, Issue 1, Business Source Complete [T Chenoweth]**

America is going to have an Africa Command for the same reason people buy real estate -- it's a good investment. __Too many large, hostile powers surround Central Asia for the radical jihadists to expand there, but Africa?__ Africa's the strategic backwater of the world. Nobody cares about Africa except Western celebrities. So __as the Middle East__ middle-__ages__ over the next three decades __and Asia's infrastructural build-out is completed, only Africa will remain as a source for__ both __youth-driven revolution and cheap labor and commodities. Toss in global warming and you've got a recipe for the most deprived becoming the most depraved. The U.S., through its__ invasion and __botched occupation of Iraq, has dramatically sped up globalization's frightening reformatting process in the Middle East, and with Africa on deck, the__ __U__nited __S__tates __military is engaging in a highly strategic flanking maneuver. Africa Command promises to be everything Central Command has failed to become.__ It will be interagency from the ground up. __It will be based on interactions with locals__ first and leaders second. __It will engage in preemptive nation-building instead of preemptive regime change. It will "reduce the future battlespace"__ that America has neither intention nor desire to own. __It'll be Iraq done right. Combined Joint Task Force__-Horn of Africa here __in Djibouti is the clear model for what comes next__, according to Rear Admiral Bob Moeller, who heads up the Defense Department's transition team planning Africom's structure. __It is the franchise that will be replicated across the entire continent.__
 * And, success of the task force is key to AFRICOM and continent wide solvency - this prevents future interventions and conflict.**
 * Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions, 6-27-07 (Esquire, “The Americans Have Landed,” http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707 [T Chenoweth])**



__The eradication__ both __of__ existing __terrorist cells and potential__ future __terrorist threats__ and combinations __cannot be achieved without__ careful, considered __attention to uplifting governance__ in general __throughout the region and boosting particular political goods selectively, country by country.__ Yet, __even if the__ __U__nited __S__tates and the European Union (EU) __were to expend appropriate sums to assist the governments of the region__ with improving aspects of governance, __not all of these nation-states would embrace__ or welcome __such initiatives. Few are anxious to chance their__ control or __dominance__ internally. Few are as desirous as they might be, __and fewer are able, to deliver political goods__ of the quality and in the quantities __that would significantly help__ to achieve the aspirations of their peoples. __The quality of the rule of law or economic enablement__, much less domestic security and political freedom, __will not change for the better without newly created partnerships__ forged for such ends __between the U__nited __S__tates, the EU, __and__ many if not all of __the countries in the__ greater __Horn__ of Africa region. Hence, because __the__ __U__nited __S__tates desperately wants to reduce the threat of terrorism, Washington __must craft new__, broad __policy initiatives__ toward the region as a whole and toward the critical nation-states individually. __CJTF-HOA, understaffed as it is, cannot be expected to bear the burden of nation building in the Horn__ of Africa and Yemen. There are ample opportunities for multinational coordination with regard to improving good governance in the region. France has long had a military and political presence in Djibouti. Italy has an interest, from colonial times, in the region, especially Somalia and Eritrea. Britain has colonial links to Kenya, Somaliland, and the Sudan. Norway played a substantial role in negotiating a peace agreement between the Sudan's North and South. The EU as a whole has a variety of ties to the region and to individual countries. The United States once had an important listening post in Eritrea, enjoys naval rights in Kenya, was alternately allied with Ethiopia and Somalia, and has suffered direct attack in Yemen and Kenya. It also has a military base in Djibouti. __Americans__ and Europeans should cooperate to increase governmental capabilities in the region. Working together, they __can build new and maintain existing infrastructures. They can find ways to create jobs in a region typified by high unemployment.__ Local educational efforts are few, leading to high rates of underemployment among secondary school leavers and others with less training. Europeans and __Americans can__ direct their attention to such critical needs, can __upgrade health facilities in the crucial battles against HIV/AIDS__ (increasingly a menace to Ethiopia and Somalia), __tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as against dangerous epizootic diseases__ like Rift Valley fever and rinderpest. They should support local efforts to embed the rule of law and expand political freedom. __Positive activities in__ each of __these arenas will directly and indirectly strengthen security and counterterrorism capabilities. The battle against terrorism is__ as much, if not __more__, __a battle for__ improved governance and, as a consequence, for __local hearts and minds.__ Although France, Italy, and Britain have a long-standing expert knowledge of portions of the region and high-level staff fluent in local languages, __the__ __U__nited __S__tates __no longer possesses the regional expertise and capable linguists__ that __it once had in the__ Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the several __military services.__ Indeed, __the__ greater __Horn__ of Africa region (Yemen excepted) __is in too many respects a terra incognita to Washington.__ Intelligence personnel responsible for overseeing the region may have no direct acquaintance with it. U.S. embassies and consulates are fewer than they were in the 1980s; __budget cuts and personnel retrenchments have left U.S.__ diplomatic, intelligence, and __military services impoverished in terms of an intimate knowledge of the region and the countries that it comprises.__ Although Washington helped to ensure the ultimate delivery of the Sudanese peace pact of early 2005, there was still no permanent American ambassador resident in Khartoum (based elsewhere since 1997) and no equivalent presence in Somalia. Indeed, __Washington lacks any coherent vision for integrating and advancing__ American diplomatic and __security initiatives in the region. The struggle against terrorism requires__ just such __a far-ranging vision, directed and coordinated at the highest levels. The battle against terror__ in the vulnerable countries along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean __is best prosecuted from a__ holistic __regional perspective.__ The threat is transnational and respects no boundaries. In any event, __none of__
 * And, the plan solves public health infrastructure which spills over to terrorism and good governance. Other measures are impossible unless the military acts first.**
 * Robert I. Rotberg, president of the World Peace Foundation and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005 (__Battling Terrorism in the Horn of__ __Africa____,__ Rotberg (ed.), More quals: professor of political science and history at MIT; academic vice president at Tufts University; president of Lafayette College; Copyright: The World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution, p. 6-8 [T Chenoweth])**



__international__ land or sea __borders presents an effective barrier to infiltrators.__ Drugs and arms __smugglers__ and cattle and sheep rustlers __can cross__ almost anywhere __at will.__ A history of interpenetration, long decades of evasion, tribal or warrior dominance of frontier areas remote from national capitals, adherence to customary entrepreneurial obligations, and __the absence of robust security contingents beyond major cities make regional measures and cooperation necessary, urgent__, and probably insufficient. The regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) tries weakly to organize relevant common responses. Bringing Yemen into IGAD would be sensible, and helpful in forging a more vigorous common approach to terror and its eradication. (But Yemen may not wish to be considered "African," and IGAD members might resist the inclusion of a new country.) __There is no substitute for greater U.S. involvement in any and all forums for the greater Horn__ of Africa region and Yemen. As important as a vastly strengthened regional approach will be, __Washington__ also __needs a nuanced new policy crafted for__ and appropriate to __the region__ and each of its countries.

As a matter of "homeland defense," the __U__nited __S__tates must increase disease surveillance and research in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. The basic capability currently exists in DoD, though it is extremely limited. An __expanded capability must include cooperative efforts with African nations that emphasize outbreak__ isolation, containment and __elimination. This action will directly **assist** African nations in attenuating disease threats, and allow them to build the capabilities to provide their own__ containment and elimination __programs for the future.__ Research and surveillance clinics, staffed by U. S. and host nation personnel, should be established in each of the four major subregions of the subcontinent (east, west, central and south). It is worth noting that these activities will afford the United States an enhanced capability to deal not only with "acts Page 27 22 of nature," but also with deliberate uses of biological weapons by a future enemy. • Increasing the national disease surveillance efforts should be linked with an increase in exercises of the scope and capability of the 1994/1995 MEDFLAG series. Such __exercises should focus on education and training to improve disease prevention,__ hygiene, public sanitation, disease vector control methods, disaster management and medical expertise for cases of mass refugees. __Medical civic action projects must focus on **assisting** the host nation in projecting and stabilizing the **medical infrastructure** and medical care capability within the areas of greatest need__. Mass immunization of children, basic dental and medical care, and medical "train the trainer" programs are highly effective. __These exercises greatly enhance the skills of personnel__ and units __in combined and joint task force operations.__ The relatively low threat environment makes it a good training venue. __This__ deliberate planning and execution __can better prepare U. S. military units and higher commands for more rapid response requirements such as disaster relief. The additional benefit of having worked with__ and trained numerous __African personnel could facilitate the rapid inclusion of trained African medical care responders in future disaster relief operations__ in Africa and elsewhere in the world. • As an admittedly more complex and problematic issue, DoD must have a regional or sub-unified command that can provide a full-time focus on Africa. As noted earlier, the African continental land mass falls under the responsibility of two U. S. military commands (the U. S. European Command and the U. S. Central Command) whose primary focus is elsewhere. Islands surrounding the continent fall under the purview of other commands. The U. S. European Command, in times of crisis in Europe, cannot devote the necessary attention to the 40 African countries that are within its area of responsibility. DoD can no longer afford simply to wait and react to the next crisis in Africa. A regional command separate from the U. S. European Command or the U. S. Central Command should be established to evaluate, plan and execute regional military exercises and operations. A more specific regional focus would enhance DoD coordination and cooperation with the country teams, USAID, NGOs, and PVOs, as well as African organizations such as the Organization of African Unity. One result of instituting just these three DoD changes will be a powerful preventive defense program which, if melded with a preventive diplomacy program, could have a significant bearing on African regional stability__. A failure to implement these changes will,__ at a minimum, __ensure that larger and less-well-prepared forces must be rapidly deployed into the next African__ Page 28 23 __humanitarian disaster__. Instituting these recommendations provides no guarantee that complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa will be avoided; however, it is likely that the frequency, cost and magnitude of the subsequent interventions will be less. __Ultimately these actions by DoD would expand African nations' capabilities for assuming greater responsibility in African disasters. The United States stands at the brink of an era in which, with great vision and minimal additional expenditure of resources, it can profoundly affect the well-being of a huge area of the world.__ It is clearly in the national interest to do so. History is scathingly unkind to those who fail to rise to the challenges of their generation.
 * And, military health assistance creates sustainable health care by developing African capabilities.**
 * William Fox, Command Surgeon of the Joint Readiness Training Center, 97 (MILITARY MEDICAL OPERATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE DoD "POINT OF THE SPEAR" FOR A NEW CENTURY, [|http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub202.pdf)]**